The home of Lydia Leister near Gettysburg. National Archives

As the last shots of the day faded that night, a contingent of weary officers rode into the yard of Lydia Leister's home. Situated on the Taneytown Road behind Cemetery Ridge, this humble two-room house served as headquarters for the Army of the Potomac. A modest, wood frame building with a single fireplace, the widow Leister made her living by working a small farm that included a small log barn, orchard, and vegetable garden. By the evening of July 2, the widow's fences had been partially knocked over and the garden trampled by the passage of courier's horses. Leister's food stores had been raided by hungry staff officers and headquarters guards, and some of her furniture dragged into the yard for use as writing desks. Now her home was host to one of the most important meetings that would take place during the battle.

Stamping the mud from their boots on the porch, the officers entered the small room lit only by several flickering candles. Seated at the table to make notes was Maj. General Daniel Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff who had served General Hooker in that capacity and remained on the staff at Meade's request. Taking seats around the room was a host of generals: John Newton, newly assigned to command the First Corps after the end of the fighting on July 1; John Gibbon, in charge of the Second Corps; David B. Birney, in command of the Third Corps after the wounding of General Sickles; George Sykes, whose Fifth Corps had seen so much of the fighting that day; John Sedgwick, the bright eyed commander of the newly arrived Sixth Corps; O.O. Howard, who's battered Eleventh Corps had settled on Cemetery Hill; Alpheus Williams, temporary commander of the Twelfth Corps; Henry Slocum, a bitterly honest and dedicated officer who believed in standing one's ground; and Winfield S. Hancock, the reliable corps commander whose battlefield expertise and command decisions had saved the day on the Union left. Also among the group was an exhausted General Warren, the "savior of Round Top", who slumped to the floor and rapidly fell asleep as the meeting began. General Mead listened intently as his corps commanders reported the conditions of their respective fronts and expressed opinions on what the Confederates may be devising for another day of battle.

Gen. Gibbon Generals in Blue

Junior in rank to the other officers in the room, John Gibbon listened carefully to the discussion of each corps commander and later recalled the experience: "The discussion at first was very informal and in the shape of conversation, during which each one made comments on the fight and told what he knew of the condition of affairs. In the course of this discussion, Newton expressed the opinion that, 'this was no place to fight a battle in.' General Newton was an officer of engineers and was rated by me, and I suppose by most others, very highly as a soldier. The assertion, therefore, coming from such a source, rather startled me and I eagerly asked what his objections to the position were. The objections he stated... related to some minor details of the line, of which I knew nothing except so far as my own front was concerned. But the prevailing impression seemed to be that the place for the battle had been in a measure selected for us. Here we are; now what is the best thing to do?"

The Council of War in the Leister House. National Archives

The discussion continued for several minutes until General Butterfield suggested that the question be formally asked to the members of the council. Three questions were asked, including whether the army should remain at Gettysburg or retire to a better position, wait for Lee to attack or attack him, and how long should the army wait before striking Lee? Almost to a man, the officers agreed to correct any awkward positions in the line and remain on the field for another day. Due to the heavy casualties in three of Meade's army corps, they deemed it best to wait for Lee to attack before moving against him. The last officer to comment, General Henry Slocum, put it quite succinctly: "Stay and fight it out!"

With the decisions made, the council of war ended. The generals paid their respects as they prepared to return to their troops, each striding out the door into a yard filled with horses and orderlies. General Gibbon was about to leave when he was suddenly confronted by the army commander:

"Before I left the house Meade made a remark to me which surprised me a good deal, especially when I look back upon the occurrence of the next day. By a reference to the votes in the council... the majority of the members were in favor of acting on the defensive and awaiting the action of Lee. In referring to the matter, just as the council broke up, Meade said to me, 'If Lee attacks to-morrow, it will be on your front.' I asked why he thought so and he replied, 'Because he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our center.' I expressed the hope that he would, and told General Meade, with confidence, that if he did we would defeat him."*

Meade's words were prophetic. Lee would indeed attack on July 3rd, but not as the Confederate commander had planned that same evening in his own council. The next great blow would fall against the Union center in what has become known as the greatest charge of the war.

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Widow Leister's House

The Leister House soon after the battle had ended. Library of Congress

The Leister House today. Gettysburg NMP

*(General Gibbon's account was written in 1887 and first published in the "Philadelphia Weekly Press" and later reprinted in the monumental series, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.)

Recommended Reading: Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. Description: America's Civil War raged for more than four years, but it is the three days of fighting in the Pennsylvania countryside in July 1863 that continues to fascinate, appall, and inspire new generations with its unparalleled saga of sacrifice and courage. From Chancellorsville, where General Robert E. Lee launched his high-risk campaign into the North, to the Confederates' last daring and ultimately-doomed act, forever known as Pickett's Charge, the battle of Gettysburg gave the Union army a victory that turned back the boldest and perhaps greatest chance for a Southern nation. Continued below...

 

Army of the Potomac

Recommended Reading: Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (Civil War America) (Hardcover). Description: In a groundbreaking, comprehensive history of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863, Kent Masterson Brown draws on previously unused materials to chronicle the massive effort of General Robert E. Lee and his command as they sought to expeditiously move people, equipment, and scavenged supplies through hostile territory and plan the army's next moves. More than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains and tens of thousands of livestock accompanied the army back to Virginia. Continued below...

The movement of supplies and troops over the challenging terrain of mountain passes and in the adverse conditions of driving rain and muddy quagmires is described in depth, as are General George G. Meade's attempts to attack the trains along the South Mountain range and at Hagerstown and Williamsport, Maryland. Lee's deliberate pace, skillful use of terrain, and constant positioning of the army behind defenses so as to invite attack caused Union forces to delay their own movements at critical times. Brown concludes that even though the battle of Gettysburg was a defeat for the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's successful retreat maintained the balance of power in the eastern theater and left his army with enough forage, stores, and fresh meat to ensure its continued existence as an effective force.

 

Recommended Reading: Commanding the Army of the Potomac (Modern War Studies) (Hardcover). Description: During the Civil War, thirty-six officers in the Army of the Potomac were assigned corps commands of up to 30,000 men. Collectively charged with leading the Union's most significant field army, these leaders proved their courage in countless battlefields from Gettysburg to Antietam to Cold Harbor. Unfortunately, courage alone was not enough. Their often dismal performances played a major role in producing this army's tragic record, one that included more defeats than victories despite its numerical and materiel superiority. Stephen Taaffe takes a close look at this command cadre, examining who was appointed to these positions, why they were appointed, and why so many of them ultimately failed to fulfill their responsibilities. He demonstrates that ambitious officers such as Gouverneur Warren, John Reynolds, and Winfield Scott Hancock employed all the weapons at their disposal, from personal connections to exaggerated accounts of prowess in combat, to claw their way into these important posts. Continued below...