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The Battle of Gettysburg in Detail:
July 1, 1863 - The Battle Begins
On the morning of June 30, a Confederate column under Brigadier General James
J. Pettigrew approached Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Road. Halting his men outside of town, the general rode ahead to Seminary Ridge from which he had a clear view of Gettysburg and the land around it. Within a few minutes he was startled by the report of
a blue-clad column approaching Gettysburg from the south. Were these men just more bothersome Yankee militia or troopers from
their old nemesis the Army of the Potomac? Under strict orders not to engage in any fighting, he ordered his troops to reverse their course, back toward Cashtown,
Pennsylvania. What to do about this column of soldiers would be the decision of his corps commander, General A.P. Hill to
whom Pettigrew would report that afternoon.
John Buford
(U.S.A.M.H.I.) | The commander of the mystery column was Brig. General John Buford, whose troops were not "Yankee militia" but a full
division of veteran cavalry. His horsemen were the advance of one wing of the Army of the Potomac, moving north from the vicinity
of Frederick, Maryland. General Buford also had unanswered questions as he watched the southern column march away- had they
found what may be a large portion of the Confederate army then raiding south-central Pennsylvania? Buford's instinct told
him these Confederates would return and he decided to keep his troops positioned around Gettysburg. Headquarters were soon
established in the Globe Hotel in Gettysburg, where Buford issued orders for his troopers to picket the roads west, north
and east of town. He then penned a message to General John Reynolds, commander of the First Corps, camped at Marsh Creek eight
miles south of Gettysburg. Reynolds received the report, which outlined Buford's intention of resisting any southern advance
toward Gettysburg. Reynolds replied that he would march to the cavalry officer's support at first light.
Meanwhile, Confederate commanders met at Cashtown eight miles west of Gettysburg,
to discuss their course of action. Under orders from General Lee not to get involved in a full scale battle, Hill and his
officers obviously believed that only troublesome militia was in their way. General Hill received Pettigrew's report of his
encounter and decided to send a larger force toward Gettysburg the next day to investigate the Union troops seen there and,
if time allowed, look for supplies. Showers and light rain that evening would also help keep down the dust and dirt on the
roads, making for a pleasant march.
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Lt. Marcellus Jones of the 8th Illinois Cavalry was in charge of a picket
line that intersected the Chambersburg Road three miles west of Gettysburg. Dawn was just breaking on the morning of July
1, 1863, when, in the distance, cavalrymen in the main post on the road could discern the sound of hushed conversations, the
clink of metal cups and canteens, and the shuffle of boots and shoes on the road surface. A sergeant ran to find Lt. Jones,
who had just returned to the reserve position with bread and butter purchased from a nearby farm. Jones immediately rode with
the sergeant to the post and peering through the early morning haze, he spotted a gray column of soldiers, lazily swinging
down the road toward him. Borrowing a carbine from his sergeant, the lieutenant took aim at a mounted figure in front of the
column and fired. The column abruptly stopped and the horseman pointed out the Yankee picket post. Behind him, a wisp of wind
revealed a red banner. There was no doubt that these men were- Confederates! Jones handed a brief message to a courier, instructing
him to ride as fast as possible to General Buford. Seconds later a cannon ball bounded down the road, scattering the Union
troopers as Southern bullets whined overhead. The Battle of Gettysburg had begun.
Gen. Henry Heth
(Miller's History) | The southerners spotted by Jones' picket post were veteran troops of Major General Henry Heth's division, leading the
march toward Gettysburg that morning. Well-liked by General Lee, (Heth was the only Confederate officer Lee addressed by his
first name), the plucky general was uncertain of what lay ahead of him, be it Pennsylvania militia or troops from the Army
of the Potomac, so he ordered his lead unit to deploy in a skirmish line and drive away the blue-clad troopers. The job was
given to the 5th Alabama Infantry Battalion, which advanced in good order and quickly encountered groups of cavalrymen who
fired on them from the protection of fences and trees. Three miles away at Gettysburg, General Buford calmly awaited the report
knowing full well that a thin line of cavalrymen were no match against solid ranks of infantry. Though Reynolds' corps had
started toward town that morning, Buford had to wonder if they would arrive in time before he was forced to retreat.
The McPherson Farm and ridge.
(Gettysburg NMP) | The skirmishing continued for over an hour, the troops passing over a series of rolling
ridges farm fields until Buford's men reached Willoughby Run, a shallow stream that bordered the Edward McPherson Farm on the Chambersburg Pike. Through the center of the farm is north-south ridge that lies parallel to the run, and was a good
position from which to cover the bridge that spans it. From the observatory of the Lutheran Seminary on Seminary Ridge, Buford
watched his horsemen gather on McPherson's Ridge and knew that time was running out. His men had been lucky up to this point- the Confederates had only advanced as skirmishers
and not pushed forward in solid battle lines. But southern pressure was steadily growing and the clouds of dust rising from
the pike were an obvious sign of more Confederates troops moving toward Gettysburg. Confederate artillery was just then pulling
into line on Herr's Ridge west of Willoughby Run, which meant the Confederate commander was done with skirmishing and an infantry
attack was sure to follow. General Heth had indeed discovered how slender the Union line was and having arrived at Herr's
Ridge, decided it to be the perfect point from which to launch an attack and drive away these pesky Union soldiers once and
for all. With his artillery unlimbered and ready to fire, Heth ordered his two lead infantry brigades under Brig. General
James Archer and Brig. General Joseph Davis to go forward. With red battle flags unfurled, Archer's and Davis' Confederates
set out toward McPherson's Ridge.
John F. Reynolds
(Miller's History) | From his post in the observatory of the Seminary roof, General Buford was intently observing the fighting when he was
startled by a familiar voice calling from below: "How goes it, John?" Buford immediately recognized his old friend Reynolds.
"The devil's to pay!" he replied, and rushed down to meet with the infantry commander. The two officers quickly discussed
the situation and rode together to McPherson's Ridge. Reynolds chose the ridge as the best location to establish an artillery
and infantry battle line, but southern pressure on Buford's men was mounting and Reynolds knew his men would have to move
fast. With a casual salute, Reynolds rode off to hurry his troops forward. It was the last time Buford would see the general
alive.
James Archer
(Miller's History) | Within a half-hour, the vanguard of Reynolds' corps arrived near the Seminary and moved toward the McPherson Farm,
while more soldiers filed into the field west of the school building. By this time, the advance of General Archer's brigade
had reached the woods and field south of McPherson's farm and turned their attention to the blue-clad infantry forming in
their front. This was the famous "Iron Brigade", which had won its reputation on the battlefields of Second Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, and was commanded by Brigadier General Solomon Meredith. Meredith had just ordered the first regiment
of the brigade, the 2nd Wisconsin Infantry, to deploy into battle line when the first volley from Archer's men struck them
from the edge of the woods. The black-hatted Wisconsin soldiers had not even had a chance to load their rifles, but with bayonets
fixed and little more encouragement required, the 2nd Wisconsin lunged into the woods. Caught off guard by the sudden counterattack,
the Confederates fired a few scattered shots and then retreated in disorder through the woods and across Willoughby Run, with
the Union soldiers in hot pursuit. A number of southerners found themselves cut off and were taken prisoner including General
Archer, grappled from the southern ranks by Private Patrick Maloney of the 2nd Wisconsin Infantry.
A guide points to the site where General Reynolds was killed in the woods that border the McPherson Farm. Seminary Ridge
is in the background.
(Brady Collection, Library of Congress) | Riding behind the 2nd Wisconsin, General Reynolds cheered the men on as they scrambled
into the woods. The general turned toward Seminary Ridge to see what troops and officers were following, when he suddenly
slumped in his saddle. A staff officer rushed to the general's side as he toppled from his horse. Cradling the general, the
officer felt blood on the back of Reynolds' head and turning him over saw that a bullet had cleanly struck the general in
the right temple, killing him instantly. John Reynolds was the highest ranking officer of either side to lose his life at
Gettysburg and was the general who had recommended General Meade to replace General Hooker in command of the Army of the Potomac. The general's body was borne from the field in an ambulance,
escorted by his heartbroken staff officers. He was buried in his hometown of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, barely 40 miles away
from the battleground where he had lost his life.
Rufus Dawes
(State of WI) | Fighting
also erupted in fields north of the McPherson Farm, where Davis' Brigade of Mississippi and North Carolina regiments routed
part of General Lysander Cutler's Union brigade. When success seemed within their grasp, Davis' regiments were thrown back
in confusion by a rapid Union infantry charge and accurate artillery fire. Taking refuge in the bed of an unfinished railroad,
Davis' troops desperately fought back as Union troops formed in their front and then charged the southerners. At the center
of the charge was Lieutenant Colonel Rufus R. Dawes whose 6th Wisconsin Infantry, also from the Iron Brigade, successfully
trapped many of the Confederates in the deepest section of the Railroad Cut. Sgt. Frank Waller wrested the colors of the 2nd Mississippi Infantry from the flag bearer in the railroad bed during the
short, deadly struggle. There was no escape for the southerners in the cut soon covered by members of the 6th Wisconsin, 95th
New York and the 14th Brooklyn (84th New York), which threw troops across the railroad bed west of the cut. Mercifully the
Union troops held their fire and called for the Confederates to surrender. Over 200 men from Davis' brigade were now prisoners.
Abner Doubleday
(B&L) | A
lull in the battle ensued as both sides withdrew to restore order and wait for the arrival of additional troops and artillery.
Casualties in this early contest were severe for both sides and though the Union army had lost one of its most distinguished
generals, the Confederates had suffered more than their Union counterparts. General Archer was captured and the better part
of two brigades was knocked out of action for the remainder of the day. Realizing that he was facing more than Pennsylvania
militia, General Heth wisely decided to wait for the remainder of his division and artillery to arrive on the battlefield,
and then to ask permission of General Hill to continue the attack. General Abner Doubleday, having assumed command of the
First Corps upon the death of General Reynolds, arranged his troops in a defensive line starting on McPherson's Ridge. He
used troops of General Robinson's Division to extend the line northward on Oak Ridge, which is the northern extension of Seminary Ridge, and then sent an aide to find General Howard to report his position.
O.O. Howard
(Miller's History) | Major General Oliver Otis Howard, commander of the Eleventh Corps, arrived on the battlefield that morning at approximately
the same time that Reynolds was killed. Howard climbed to the roof of a building in Gettysburg where he spotted some Union
troops break through the woods on Seminary Ridge and run toward town. Believing that the First Corps had broken and was in
retreat, Howard fired off a desperate message to General Meade at Taneytown, Maryland, that the situation was bad and reinforcements
were needed. (The message had unfortunate consequences for General Doubleday, whose generalship on July 1 would later be called
into question.) Howard ordered General Carl Schurz to take command of the Eleventh Corps as he assumed command of all Union
troops on the field, vice Reynolds and Doubleday, and then sent the Eleventh Corps into the fields north of Gettysburg to
bolster the First Corps right flank. One division of the corps was placed on Cemetery Hill just south of town as a reserve force. This proved to be a very important decision that day, securing what was to be a vital
position for the Union army.
General Meade was still at Taneytown when he received Howard's disturbing
message that included news of Reynolds' death. Though shaken at the loss of one of his closest friends in the army, Meade
immediately decided to send another trusted corps commander, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, north to Gettysburg to
investigate the situation and take charge of the troops there. Hancock immediately set out for the battlefield.
The brief noon-time lull in infantry movement gave commanders on both sides
time to plan and augment their battle lines. Union troops followed a jagged line extending northward from the McPherson Farm
along Oak Ridge and then east to a small knoll near the county Alms (Poor) House. Confederate forces were arrayed against
this line in heavier numbers with more troops expected to arrive at any moment. Though the Union infantry was outnumbered,
the First Corps artillery, commanded by Colonel Charles Wainwright, did have an advantage in positions where they could sweep the routes
of Confederate attacks with shell and canister.
A. P. Hill
(Miller's History) | General
Hill did not accompany Heth's troops that morning, so was unaware of his dilemma near Gettysburg. Shortly before noon a small
entourage of mounted officers arrived at his headquarters, led by a stern-faced General Lee. The generals were discussing
the location of Hill's corps and possible enemy sightings when they were interrupted by the boom of cannon coming from the
direction of Gettysburg. Concerned, Lee chose to ride ahead toward the sound of the guns accompanied by Hill and both staffs.
It was on the Cashtown-Gettysburg Road where they met a courier from General Heth, bearing news that a large Union force had
been encountered and stating confidence they could be driven off. Lee hurried on toward the battle that he was not yet ready
to give on Union soil.
The Battle is Renewed
Captain James Hall's 2nd Maine Battery opens fire on Confederate batteries on the Chambersburg Pike.
(Battles
and Leaders) |
Fighting swirls around the McPherson buildings.
(Battles & Leaders) | Heth renewed his attack against the Union positions on the McPherson Farm between 1:30
and 2 o'clock. Supported by Maj. General William Pender's division, Heth sent his two remaining brigades forward to hit a
re-enforced line posted behind strong farm fences and in the woods above Willoughby Run. Doubleday's line was stretched thin,
but his division and brigade commanders shifted troops around to strengthen weak areas of the line. Determined to stand their
ground, the Union troops would not budge no matter how much pressure the Confederates applied. On the McPherson Farm and adjacent
Herbst Farm, the Iron Brigade fought toe to toe with Brig. General James J. Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade. At one point
in the battle, opposing lines blazed into one another barely twenty paces apart. Two regiments were especially hard hit- the
24th Michigan Infantry (70% casualties) and the 26th North Carolina Infantry (80% casualties). Twenty one year-old Colonel Henry Burgwyn Jr., commanding the 26th North Carolina, was mortally wounded
while leading one of the last charges against the 24th Michigan: shot, "through both lungs, he fell with the Twenty-sixth's
Regimental Flag wrapped around him." Burgwyn was the youngest commanding colonel in Lee's army.
Robert E. Rodes
(Miller's History) | Spread out between York and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Lt. General Richard S. Ewell's Corps had been ordered to consolidate
in the Gettysburg area on July 1. Setting out early that morning, Ewell's 8,500 troops closed in on Gettysburg from the north
and northeast. Maj. General Robert Rodes' Division was the first to arrive and attacked the right flank of the Union First
Corps on Oak Ridge, the northern extension of Seminary Ridge. The Union troops on Oak Ridge were from a division commanded
by Brig. General John C. Robinson, of the First Corps. Robinson only had Colonel Henry Baxter's brigade of New York, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania regiments at his disposal and observing the disjointed southern attack, shifted his men to meet each threat
upon his position. One by one Baxter's troops repulsed the Confederate assaults and annihilated the North Carolina brigade
commanded by Brig. General Alfred Iverson. Iverson's soldiers marched into an open field unsupported, not realizing the strength
of the Union position behind the stone wall that lay ahead on Oak Ridge. Over 1,100 Union soldiers rose and fired into the
southerners from less than 100 feet away. Few escaped the terrible fire unscathed. Many surrendered to Baxter's men as they
rushed into the field to take prisoners and capture flags from their fallen bearers.
John Robinson
(NY State Archives) | With Baxter's regiments running low on ammunition, General Robinson called in Brig. General Samuel Paul's brigade,
which replaced Baxter's troops just before General Rodes renewed his attack. Paul's men were soon fighting for their lives
as Rodes shifted regiments from other commands into the attack. General Paul was horribly wounded when a bullet struck him
in the face, passing through both eyes. Remarkably, he survived this horrific wound. Ammunition began to run out. A Confederate
brigade succeeded in reaching woods behind Paul's regiments, threatening to cut them off from the rest of the First Corps.
A retreat was ordered to follow Oak Ridge and rejoin the corps. The brigade withdrew, all except for one regiment, the 16th
Maine Infantry. The Maine soldiers stubbornly held onto their corner of the stone wall and did not leave until the last moment.
Many of the regiment were taken prisoner, including its commander Colonel Tilden. So that their flag would not be taken, the
16th's soldiers ripped the standard into small pieces, each of which was taken by the men.
While Rodes dealt with Baxter and Paul on Oak Ridge, Brig. General George
Doles' brigade of Georgia troops sparred with Schurz's Eleventh Corps positioned in the fields north of Gettysburg. Though
he was outnumbered, Doles' superb generalship kept the Yankee troops, who appeared shaky from the beginning, off guard. Poor
morale, exhaustion, and the exposed position of the Eleventh Corps troops, many who were German and Polish immigrants, contributed
to the disaster about to befall them. Another division of Ewell's infantry under Brig. General Jubal Early, arrived via the
Harrisburg Road at approximately 3 P.M. Understanding the advantage of his position, Early deployed his troops and artillery
so that he could sweep behind the Union line.
A thunderous roar of artillery announced his arrival as ranks of southern
infantry set out across Rock Creek. Seeing his opportunity, General Doles sent his brigade forward and the two wings of the
Confederate column came together around "Barlow's Knoll". Though some regiments fought with determination, the Confederate
attack broke the line and retreat turned into a panicked rush into Gettysburg. A single Union brigade under Colonel Wladimir
Kryzanowski, a Polish immigrant, attempted to make a stand, but was swept aside by overwhelming numbers. Victorious Confederates
overran the remaining feeble resistance, a small brigade of Union troops under Colonel Charles Coster, and entered Gettysburg.
Union troops of the First Corps delay Hill's advance near the Seminary.
(Battles and Leaders) | West of town, General Doubleday and his First Corps were also in deep trouble. After
several hours of fighting marked by great gallantry on both sides, casualties had whittled down the corps' effective force
to less than half of the Confederates who seemed to continually be sending in fresh troops. Doubleday withdrew his command
into a consolidated position on Seminary Ridge where the men threw down fence rails for a barricade and waited as the Confederates
formed on McPherson's Ridge for a final assault. But driving Doubleday's command from Seminary Ridge proved more deadly than
Hill and his division officers had planned. The initial Confederate attack met a storm of concentrated artillery and musketry
fire that nearly destroyed General Alfred Scales' North Carolina brigade and severely crippled part of a South Carolina brigade
commanded by Colonel Abner Perrin. Outnumbered, low on ammunition and with his rear threatened, there was nothing more Doubleday
could achieve by holding Seminary Ridge. There was no alternative but to retreat through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill.
The Union line collapses
Despite a severe cross fire and heavy casualties suffered during their charge,
Colonel Perrin's South Carolinians exploited a narrow gap in the Union line and raced onto Seminary Ridge just as the Union
officers ordered their men to pull out. Perrin ordered two of his regiments to pursue the retreating Federals and the incensed
South Carolinians raced after the refuges in blue, taking prisoners and shooting down those who refused to surrender. What
began as an orderly retreat soon turned into a confused race through Gettysburg as soldiers trotted through unfamiliar streets
and alleys while other lost souls ploughed into the crowd from intersecting streets. Adding to the chaos was the lack of orders
to direct the refugees to Cemetery Hill, the Union rallying point. Lost soldiers ran from one street to another to find themselves
confronted by armed Confederates. Others took refuge in cellars and buildings, only to be rooted out and taken prisoner. Wounded
soldiers collapsed in doorways and churches where Gettysburg civilians, such as 21 year-old Sallie Myers, tried to tend to their wounds. Terrified civilians took to their cellars
while above them the floors creaked with the heavy sounds of boots. Rifle shots echoed through the streets. Peering from his
cellar window, one man was horrified by the sight of a Union soldier shot down in the street in front of his home. Everywhere
there were Confederate soldiers with rifles and fixed bayonets, looking for Yankees who had not made their escape.
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Christ Lutheran Church on Chambersburg Street was one
of the first churches in Gettysburg to be used as a hospital. Wounded were laid on boards set on top of church pews while
operations took place in one of the front rooms. The monument in front of the church is to Chaplain Thomas Howell of the 90th
Pennsylvania Infantry. Confronted by Confederate soldiers during the Union retreat, Howell refused to surrender his sword
and was shot dead on the church steps.
(Gettysburg NMP) |
W.S. Hancock
(Miller's History) | Those who did find their way to Cemetery Hill were confronted by General Winfield Scott Hancock, sent to Gettysburg
by General Meade to assume command after the death of Reynolds. Galloping onto Cemetery Hill at 4:30, Hancock beheld a depressing
sight: streets filled with masses of Union troops without order, lathered teams of horses pulling artillery limbers forcing
their way through the crowd, and wounded soldiers limping or staggering along as if drunk. For all purposes the entire Union
force at Gettysburg had been routed. Joined by General Howard, Hancock rode into the center of the Baltimore Pike and immediately
barked orders for officers to rally their commands and find shelter on the hillside. Hancock's commanding presence and stern
demeanor was enough for most of the exhausted soldiers to search for their regiments and fall into ranks. Hancock paused just
long enough to send a report to General Meade before returning to the task of establishing a strong center for the
remainder of the Union line to form upon. By nightfall, reorganized regiments had established a line of defenses from Cemetery Ridge to Culp's Hill with Cemetery Hill at the fortified center.
Once he arrived on the battlefield that afternoon, General Lee appreciated
the advantages gained by the sweat and toil of his troops and gave his consent for the attack to continue. He entered Gettysburg
on the trail of his soldiers, very concerned with the growing Union strength on Cemetery Hill and the adjacent Culp's Hill.
Lee sent a message to General Ewell to take the hills "if practicable"; but Ewell was unable to consolidate his forces to
attack before nightfall and the battered Union troops remained undisturbed throughout the evening. Additional Union troops
arrived to bolster the Union defenses, followed by General Meade who reached the field around midnight. Thanking Hancock for
his services, Meade set about planning for the next day's battle. Though two corps had been defeated and thrown back, their
heroic stance had bought time for the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to close on Gettysburg and camp on a position so
strong that Lee would be hard pressed to break it. Whether he was fully ready or not, Lee had been drawn into battle and Meade
was prepared to fight it to the finish at Gettysburg.
General Lee's headquarters tent was pitched near the Thompson home on the
Chambersburg Pike, an ideal location adjacent to the Lutheran Seminary building where the general could utilize the rooftop
observatory. Seating himself by the light of a candle in his tent, Lee pondered the day's events. Though his soldiers had
driven the Union forces from the field in disarray and captured the town, he certainly had not won the battle necessary to
accomplish all of his objectives in Pennsylvania. Losses in Heth's and Rodes' Divisions had been staggering, but the remainder
of his army was within a day's march, defiantly confident and fit to fight for another day at least. Against his desires,
the ground for the great battle had been chosen and the growing strength of the Union position on Cemetery Hill and Culp's
Hill concerned him. More fighting clearly lay ahead and Lee had to satisfy himself that the hills would be taken the following
day. If only he knew more of where the rest of the Union army was located and how close they were to Gettysburg. That had
been "Jeb" Stuart's job and Lee had not heard from him for almost two weeks.
In more than twelve hours of fighting, approximately 16,000 soldiers were
killed, wounded or captured during the first day of battle.
The Battle of Gettysburg in Detail:
July 2, 1863-
"A most terrible day..."
The Confederate victory
on July 1st wasn't conclusive. The Army of the Potomac was still present near Gettysburg and by early morning held a strong position on the hills and ridges south of town
in a horseshoe-shaped line bristling with artillery. With its right anchored on Culp's Hill, the line stretched through Cemetery Hill and southward to a knoll on Cemetery Ridge, north of two hills that locals referred to as the Round Tops. Troops who had arrived overnight were also arrayed at the
base of the smaller of the two hills, partially cleared of tree growth to reveal large boulders and hundreds of rocks, known
as Little Round Top. Despite the loss of Reynolds and the majority of two army corps, Meade was satisfied with his army's position, not only
for defense but for an attack as well. Union troops of the Twelfth Corps east of Culp's Hill may have an opportunity to attack
Lee's flank if possible. But as the morning sun peeked through overcast, rainy skies, the commanding general decided to pull
those troops into the horseshoe and wait for Lee to make the next move. The question was, from which direction would the Confederate
attack come? Having sought opinions from his most trusted officers, Meade decided to bring forward the remainder of his army,
repulse any Confederate attack, and if the opportunity arose, he would, in turn, strike at Lee.
Lee rose before dawn to formulate his plan of attack for the day. In the early
morning light he surveyed the strong Union position and realized that a weakness might lay on the Union flanks. A simultaneous
strike on both the right and left of Meade's position could roll up the Union line toward Cemetery Hill. The weakest flank
was the Union left, which did not appear to be anchored on any high ground including the Round Tops at the southern base of
Cemetery Ridge. After consultation with corps commanders A.P. Hill and James Longstreet, Lee dictated orders that Hill would
remain in position at the Confederate center while General Longstreet's Corps would attack on the right and General Ewell's
Corps would strike on the left. Both had to strike at the same time to throw the Union off balance, not giving Meade time
to shift troops to the threatened areas.
Gen. Longstreet
(National Archives) | Ewell's men were close to the field that morning, but James Longstreet's were not. Two divisions of his corps had stopped
for the night several miles away from the field with a third too far away to assist that day. The two divisions under Generals
John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws set out at 4 AM that morning but had not yet arrived near Gettysburg while Lee was formulating
plans for an early morning assault. By the time they arrived it was after 8 o'clock, and Lee was forced to alter his timetable.
Orders were finally re-issued at mid morning for General Longstreet to put his troops in motion. Not thrilled with his assignment
because of the unfamiliarity of the ground and his desire to fight defensively, a disgruntled Longstreet put Hood and McLaws
in motion on secondary roads south. After considerable delay, the march began filled with hope as the early morning drizzle
had ended and the sky cleared. Yet misinformation and poor scouting thwarted the march. The day grew warm and the roads turned
dusty under the tramping feet of 16,000 soldiers. Midway to the assigned positions, the lead scouts discovered that the road
crested a ridge where signalmen on Little Round Top could easily spot the Confederate column. Somehow this critical location
had not been reported by Captain Samuel R. Johnston, the officer in charge of an early morning reconnaissance to that area.
Longstreet's men had to counter-march, or retrace their route back to another road that proved a more secluded route toward
the southern tip of Seminary Ridge.
It was not until 3:30 PM when Hood's and McLaws' men finally reached their
positions and formed battle lines having marched an exhausting 18 miles since sunrise. Very few of their troops had the opportunity
to rest or fill empty canteens before the signal guns were fired to begin the assault.
Daniel Sickles
(National Archives) | Situated on the left of the Union line were troops under the command of Major General Daniel E. Sickles of New York.
Despite his lack of military schooling, Sickles was brave, audacious, and had proven himself to be an adequate brigade commander.
In 1863 he was given command of the Third Corps, which he led at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Virginia. Sickles's corps had fought well but were ordered into a position that had a great disadvantage in ground height.
As a result, Confederate artillery had pounded his troops without mercy. On the morning of July 2, Sickles was worried that
the same situation was about to occur. Arriving at Gettysburg overnight of July 1, his troops had been ordered to occupy the
southern end of Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top. From his position the general worried that the ridge on which ran the Emmitsburg Road would be advantageous to the Confederates
if they held it. Sickles sent several messengers to headquarters that morning requesting that General Meade visit the Third
Corps line to discuss the situation. Meade declined while engaged in other duties. Certain of a Confederate threat to his
front, Sickles finally sent out a strong scouting party that included a regiment of United States Sharpshooters. Entering
Pitzer Woods on Seminary Ridge, the sharpshooters encountered Confederate forces from A.P. Hill's Corps and a brisk fight ensued.
Returning to the Union line, the scouts reported that the woods ahead of Sickles were full of Rebel soldiers and a dust cloud
was seen, obviously caused by a strong column of Confederate troops headed his way. Believing that the Confederate attack
would fall on him from the west, Sickles ordered his corps to advance from Cemetery Ridge and occupy the high ground at the
Emmitsburg Road.
David Birney
(LOC) | The Third
Corps was greatly under strength. Sickles had only two divisions, instead of the customary three, under Maj. General David
Birney and Brig. General A.A. Humphreys. As a precaution to cover his left flank, Birney's division was stretched from the
Peach Orchard southeast to Devil's Den. Humphrey's brigades were arrayed in a battle line with supporting columns ready to march up to the Emmitsburg Road. Though
this new line occupied some high ground, it was also very weak; there were not an adequate number of soldiers to man a solid
line, especially on General Birney's front, and the advanced position presented the Confederates with a choice target to fire
upon from two directions. Sickles had moved away from the main Union line on Cemetery Ridge losing the advantage of artillery
support within a shortened front, and, perhaps most condemning, he had made the move forward in defiance of orders to stay
where his corps had been posted. This opened a wide gap on both of his flanks, susceptible to being crushed by a flank attack-
exactly what was about to happen courtesy of James Longstreet.
Longstreet's attack finally began at 4 o'clock when Confederate cannoneers
opened fire on Union positions at Devil's Den and in the Peach Orchard. General Meade had visited Sickles' headquarters a
few moments before and the two were conferring in the Peach Orchard when the Confederate guns opened fire. Despite the precarious
position he was now in, Meade ordered Sickles to stay and fight along this new line and that other troops would be sent to
assist.
Lee attacked late in the afternoon, striking both flanks of the Union position. The issue was in doubt
until after nightfall. |
General
Hood's Division was the first sent into the attack though the lanky general was unhappy with his assignment. The open farm
fields allowed Union artillery and sharpshooters to pepper his troops long before they reached the opponent's lines. Hood
approached General Longstreet, expressing several objections to the assignment given him and petitioned the general for permission
to withdraw his troops to move around Big Round Top. The corps commander blunted Hood's argument. Lee's orders had to be followed
and Hood had to continue the attack despite his objections. "Do your best, Sam," Longstreet told the obstinate Texan as he
turned his horse away. Law's Alabama Brigade stepped off from Warfield Ridge toward Devil's Den and the Round Tops, closely followed by Brig. General George Anderson's Brigade. Next to Law's men marched
the famous Texas Brigade commanded by Brig. General Jerome B. Robertson. This was General Hood's old brigade and he paid special
attention to them. Riding to the front of his old command, Hood addressed his soldiers: "Fix bayonets, my brave Texans; forward
and take those heights!" Minutes later, General Hood was carried from the battlefield with a horrendous injury to his left
arm. Brig. General Evander Law immediately took command as the troops wrestled their way around Sickles' left flank at Devil's
Den. The Confederates swung eastward through plowed fields and pastures filled with boulders, past broken fences, and headlong
toward Union cannon posted on the ridge above the den, supported by Union infantry. Fighting erupted on the slopes of Little
Round Top, in the Wheatfield, and at the Peach Orchard.
Little Round Top, photographed soon after the battle.
(Library of Congress) | Reacting to the initial Confederate charge, General Gouverneur K. Warren, Meade's chief
engineer, was able to divert Colonel Strong Vincent's Union brigade to the slopes of Little Round Top. Understanding the importance
of the hill, Vincent posted his regiments on the southern slope where they repulsed the first Confederate attacks. The southern
regiments re-organized and renewed their efforts to drive Vincent's men from the hillside with repeated attacks. Vincent's
line did not waver, however, and the Union men tenaciously held their ground. Vincent's left regiment, the 20th Maine Infantry under Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, held off the 15th Alabama Infantry for over an hour despite repeated attempts to get behind the Maine regiment and around its flank. With his regiment having
lost heavily and ammunition nearly exhausted, Colonel Chamberlain decided to make a bayonet charge when the next attack came.
The exhausted Alabamians were stopped in their tracks when a line of yelling, cursing men came down the slope at them with
bayonets gleaming in the fading light. It was enough for many who threw down their arms. Others ran for their lives back into
the woods of Big Round Top. Chamberlain approached a Confederate officer whose pistol misfired in the colonel's face, and
accepted the officer's sword in surrender. While the 20th Maine was completing its action in the woods, Vincent's right regiment,
the 16th Michigan Infantry, suddenly began to waver and give way. Screaming the "Rebel Yell", Confederates of the 4th and
5th Texas Infantry rushed up the slope in one final frenzy of shooting, stabbing, and clubbing. Racing to stem the flow of
retreating soldiers, Colonel Vincent was in the act of rallying his soldiers when he was struck down by a southern bullet.
At this critical moment Union reinforcements spearheaded by the 140th New York Infantry, arrived and halted the southern attack.
Bravery and gallantry had saved Little Round Top, a key feature on the southern end of the Union line, but at a terrible cost
in officers and men for both sides.
While the fighting raged at Little Round Top and around Devil's Den, Union
troops in the Wheatfield came under attack first from G.T. Anderson's Georgia Brigade, followed soon after by the South Carolina
Brigade of Brig. General Joseph Kershaw. Having left the protection of stone walls on Seminary Ridge, Kershaw's troops crossed the Emmitisburg Road dogged the entire way by Union cannon
stationed in the Peach Orchard. Passing into the Rose Farm, Kershaw realized that his men would have to face two separate
lines of Union infantry, one at the Peach Orchard and the other placed on a stone-covered hill adjacent to the Wheatfield.
Forced to split his brigade in half, the general's left regiments moved against the orchard as his right marched toward the
stony hill. Just behind Kershaw, the brigade of Brig. General Paul Semmes arrived and rushed to support the South Carolinian's
attack. The fighting swirled through the woods surrounding the field as Anderson's troops probed and moved to outflank the
Union forces under Generals DeTrobriand and Barnes. Kershaw's Confederates sought to split the Union defenders who, though
outnumbered, fought back furiously.
Patrick Kelly
(CW Library-
Philadelphia) | Reinforcements from the Union Second Corps arrived, including the famous "Irish Brigade"
led at Gettysburg by Colonel Patrick Kelly. The total number of Irishmen barely amounted to 500 officers and men. Before the
brigade marched to the Wheatfield, Father William Corby stood upon a large boulder and granted the soldiers complete absolution
at this time of crisis. The New York regiments unfurled their unique green silk flags bearing a golden harp and shamrocks
and followed them southward. Kelly's soldiers were sent into the center of the "whirlpool", charging through the Wheatfield
and into the woods on the west side where they threw back Kershaw's South Carolinians. One soldier recalled finding hundreds
of dead and wounded soldiers amongst the rocks and called out to the unhurt Confederates to throw down their rifles and come
forward. Several did, preferring capture to certain death.
The Second Corps troops were able to clear the Wheatfield of southerners,
but only for a brief moment. The arrival of a fresh Confederate brigade of Georgia troops commanded by Brig. General William
Wofford, which had just smashed in the last Union defenders at the Peach Orchard, drove into the woods outflanking the Union
positions. The line melted before the Confederate onslaught. Wofford's regiment swept the Wheatfield and aided by men from
Kershaw's, Semmes, and Anderson's brigades, smashed into the division of U.S. Regulars commanded by General Romeyn Ayres,
the last Union soldiers who could stem the southern tide. Standing their ground, the Regulars suffered terrible casualties
when Confederates were able to sweep around the Union soldiers before they began a fighting retreat across what became known
as the "Valley of Death". Wofford's men raced on to the northern base of Little Round Top where they were suddenly counterattacked
by a brigade of "Pennsylvania Reserves". Led in the attack by General Samuel Crawford, the Pennsylvanians forced Wofford's
men back across the Valley of Death and into the Wheatfield itself. Just before the fighting ended in this area, it had reached
a crescendo in the Peach Orchard and along the Union line north of it.
General Sickles at his headquarters during the battle, sketched by Charles Reed on July 2, 1863.
(Library of Congress) | From his headquarters at the Trostle Farm, General Sickles attempted to control the flow of the battle while shifting troops to shore up his battered left. At the
height of the battle the general was struck in the leg by a cannon ball and carried from the field on a stretcher. Despite
the tremendous pain and shock, Sickles cheered on other soldiers hurrying to the front. He was taken to a field hospital where
his shattered limb was removed that night. Command of the corps now fell upon General Birney, who knew that the situation
was nearly hopeless. Union artillery at the Peach Orchard persisted in blasting back every Confederate assault, despite a
relentless volume of Confederate iron thrown at them from guns on Seminary Ridge. Hapless infantrymen could only hug the ground
as the missiles filled the air. At approximately 6:30, McLaws sent forward his Mississippi brigade commanded by Brig. General
William Barksdale. The battered Union line collapsed when Barksdale's soldiers rammed through the Peach Orchard, flanking
out Union regiments along the Emmitsburg Road. Barksdale was followed by Brig. General Wofford's Georgia brigade, which swept
on to the Wheatfield, finally clearing it of Union troops. Supported by more southern brigades from Maj. General Richard Anderson's
Division of Hill's Corps, Barksdale's men charged on, capturing cannon and shooting down Yankees who dared to make a stand.
Before them was a sizeable gap in the Union line between Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top, held by only a handful of Union
batteries and one regiment of Union infantry. Barksdale's men, joined by two brigades from General Hill's Corps, stormed toward
the gap.
On Cemetery Ridge, the 1st Minnesota Infantry was assigned to support a battery
of Union guns when they were ordered to make a desperate charge. Without wavering or questioning the order, Colonel William
Colvill led 262 of his men headlong into Brig. General Cadmus Wilcox's Alabama Brigade, halting them just long enough for
more Union troops to arrive and fill the gap. Adjacent to Wilcox rushed Perry's Florida Brigade, commanded at Gettysburg by Colonel David Lang. Lang attempted to counter
the Minnesotans charge but was in turn ambushed by another Union regiment that fired into the Floridians' flank, driving them
into Wilcox's units. A brisk Union counterattack by a brigade of New York troops under Colonel George L. Willard that drove
back Barksdale now turned on Wilcox and Lang. In danger of being flanked and possibly cut off, Wilcox ordered the two brigades
to retreat, leaving scores of dead and wounded in the path of the charge. An additional Confederate brigade that threatened
the Union line right up to its center was also thrown back, and the sounds of battle slowly died away with the sunset. Darkness
put a grateful end to the slaughter and Meade used the lull to shore up the Union left with troops from the First, Fifth,
and newly arrived Sixth Corps. What was left of Sickles' corps was consolidated with other units on Cemetery Ridge and the
Union line re-established where it had been approximately seven hours before.
The Battle For Culp's Hill
Edward Johnson
(Miller's History) | Delayed by Union artillery and poor communications, the other wing of Lee's army under General Ewell began the charge
onto Culp's Hill at dusk. Confederate infantrymen under General Edward Johnson marched from the Hanover Road to Rock Creek
at the base of Culp's Hill. Overwhelming Union artillery fire from Cemetery Hill had delayed the attack and Johnson found
that the ground he had to cross to reach Culp's Hill broke up his formations, causing more delays to stop and reorganize before
they reached Rock Creek at the base of the hill. In the gathering darkness, Johnson's men waded Rock Creek and pushed into
deep woods where they encountered Union troops under Brig. General George S. Greene. During the afternoon, most of the Twelfth
Corps had been sent from the hill toward the Round Tops to support Sickles' Corps, leaving Greene's troops to hold the hill.
Stationed behind defenses constructed of logs, rocks, and earth, Greene's single brigade of New York regiments was stretched
southward from the summit of Culp's Hill to a small knoll above Spangler's Spring. Johnson's brigades attacked the summit but reeled back under a never ending stream of Union bullets. Farther south, two
regiments of Brig. General George Steuart's Brigade drove back Union skirmishers to find the Union earthworks on the knoll
above Spangler's Spring abandoned.
 | Steuart attempted to press his units forward
but halted when small arms fire hit his regiments from the summit of the hill and from the woods west of their newly won position.
No matter in what direction the general sent his regiments, they were met with a blinding flash of musketry and forced back
to the captured earthworks and stone wall that ran over the hill. "Our loss was heavy, " General Steuart reported, "the fire
being terrific and in part a cross-fire." In the darkness, General Johnson could not determine his objectives and was uncertain
of the force arrayed before him. The determined defense of Greene's men led Johnson to believe that he was heavily outnumbered.
After communicating with General Ewell, he halted his attack at 11 PM and waited for reinforcements to arrive before renewing
the assault at dawn. Though outnumbered almost three to one, Greene's men skillfully held their positions and fought back
small probing parties of Confederates throughout the night. Additional Union regiments later arrived to support Greene and
the echoes of rifle shots finally died away as both sides attempted to get a fitful few hours of rest before the battle would
be renewed.
The Fishhook Almost Breaks: Cemetery Hill
The southern charge on Cemetery Hill.
(Battles & Leaders) | Northwest of Culp's Hill, two Confederate brigades from General Jubal Early's Division
momentarily penetrated the Union defenses at Cemetery Hill. After dusk, Colonel Isaac Avery's North Carolina Brigade and Brigadier
General Harry Hays' Louisiana Brigade, known as the "Louisiana Tigers", charged across the rolling Culp Farm and struck the Union positions at the base of the hill. The nickname for Hays' men
came from former members of the original Louisiana Tigers or Wheat's Battalion, raised in 1861 but disbanded after Major Robert
Wheat's death. The remaining Tigers were transferred into the various regiments of Hays' command where the other Louisiana
soldiers had taken a liking to the nickname and the fame attached to it.
Union artillery sent shrapnel and canister at the dark columns approaching
the hill. Soldiers fell in the corn and wheat, including Colonel Avery who was mortally wounded. Unable to speak, Avery handed
an aide a last message: "Tell my father I died with my face to the enemy." The northern fire grew in intensity as the southerners
got closer to the base of the hill where shaken Union regiments from the Eleventh Corps stood poised to resist the attack.
Undaunted, the southerners rushed the Union line where the 5th, 6th, and 7th Louisiana Regiments overpowered and routed several
Union regiments. Pouring through the gap, the Confederates rushed to the summit of Cemetery Hill and into the Union batteries
stationed there. Though many of the infantrymen scattered, the Yankee artillerymen stuck to their guns defending them with
rammers, trail spikes, pistols, and rocks taken from the nearby stone walls.
Close fighting on Cemetery Hill between Carroll's Brigade and the "Louisiana Tigers". A sketch made
soon after the battle by Alfred R. Waud
(Library of Congress) | Not quite a quarter mile away, Colonel Samuel Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps
was massed behind Cemetery Ridge when an officer approached with orders from General Hancock: move immediately to the assistance
of the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill. Carroll marched his brigade across farm fields and the Taneytown Road, and through
cemetery where they stumbled into a scene that one officer compared to "a swarm of mad bees around the hive..." Carroll, "found
the enemy up to and in among the front guns of the batteries on the road. It being perfectly dark, and with no guide, I had
to find the enemy's line entirely by their fire." Carroll's three regiments attacked, wading into the mass of milling soldiers,
breaking up the already disordered Confederate formations. An intense hand to hand battle over the Union guns began. The 6th
North Carolina Infantry had planted their regimental flag on one battery but were thrown back by a vicious bayonet charge
of Carroll's command. Several regiments from General Coster's Brigade of the Eleventh Corps joined in the counterattack and
by 10:30, the last Confederates had been thrown off Cemetery Hill. By midnight, the Union line was restored.
While evaluating his army's gains at day's end, a disappointed Lee realized
that his gamble of attacking the Union flanks simultaneously had not paid off. Longstreet's command had taken some high ground
but his losses were very heavy and Meade still held along Cemetery Ridge. The capture of Culp's Hill was still in doubt, though
if it could be secured in the morning, the Union position on Cemetery Hill and the Baltimore Pike would be threatened. Determined
to strike Meade's flank again with as much force as possible the following day, Lee consented to Johnson being re-enforced
and for the attack to continue at first light. By that time he would be able to make a better evaluation of his chances for
success in another attack on the Union flanks or devise another strategy.
Late that evening, the general had a surprise visitor. General JEB Stuart
arrived at Lee's headquarters to report on his success in riding behind the Yankee army and the capture of Federal wagons
and stores. Instead of a warm welcome, Stuart received a cutting reprimand from Lee, upset with the cavalry commander who
had not kept him informed of his movements or the position of the Union army during the past week. A shocked and embarrassed
Stuart attempted to explain, but it had no effect on the old general. Lee's temper finally cooled. "I need you to help me
fight these people," he reminded Stuart, before he changed the subject to his cavalry chief's assignment for the morrow.
General Meade spent the early evening shoring up his line by shifting troops
to threatened areas, including Culp's Hill. It was imperative that the Twelfth Corps be returned to Culp's Hill to reinforce
Greene's New Yorkers and drive out the threat to his rear at first light. Little did the Confederates who occupied the Union
earthworks at Culp's Hill realize that they were only several hundred yards from the Baltimore Pike, the main route of communication
and supply to the Union Army positions. Meade appreciated this fact and knew that measures had to be taken to block the Confederate
opportunity as soon as possible.
Lydia Leister's Farm, used by General Meade for his headquarters during the battle.
(Gettysburg National Military Park) | Yet there were many issues on the general's mind that evening when he called his generals together for a "Council of War" held at army headquarters in the home of widow Lydia Leister on the Taneytown
Road. The tiny house had two rooms, one of which was soon crowded with Meade's corps commanders, weary and dirty after the
long day. The generals spoke frankly about the battle so far and discussed the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Different
viewpoints were shared until the central question was placed before the group: Should the Army of the Potomac defend their
current position for another day or attack? Almost to a man, the officers agreed to stay at Gettysburg and wait for Lee to
attack. If he did not, then Meade should order a counterattack and force Lee to fight or flee. The Gettysburg Campaign was
about to reach its climax.
The Battle of Gettysburg in Detail:
July 3- "I
will strike him there..."
Sunset of July 2nd found the Army of the Potomac arrayed in a fishhook-shaped
line anchored solidly along Cemetery Ridge, from Big and Little Round Top to Culp's Hill, the most threatened part of the
Union line that evening. Based on the consensus of officers who attended the Council of War at Meade's headquarters, the Confederate
foothold at Culp's Hill had to be driven off to secure the Union right flank, which covered the Baltimore Pike, the all important
road into the Union rear. General Henry Slocum issued orders for his Twelfth Corps troops to return to Culp's Hill and retake
the sections occupied by General Johnson's Confederate Division as early as possible.
Preparations for the attack were completed and at 4 AM, the Twelfth Corps
counterattacked Johnson's men just as they were preparing to make their own attempt to storm Culp's Hill. Union artillery
posted on the Baltimore Pike and Powers Hill blasted southern regiments that ventured out of the captured works or pinned
them down so that movement was nearly impossible. Brig. General Alpheus S. Williams, who was placed in command of the corps
by Slocum, sent his regiments into the fighting in waves. Each attack countered every move made by Johnson's men, pinning
them into a tight area above Spangler's Spring and at the base of the hill proper. For six hours the battle on the hillside
raged. The volume of musketry was ear-splitting and the carnage appalling, especially in the meadow near Spangler's Spring.
A misunderstanding of verbal orders caused the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry and 27th Indiana Infantry to charge across the open
meadow where they were caught in a cross fire from Confederates stationed behind stone walls and earthworks. Both regiments
were decimated in the attack. The survivors staggered back to their starting point in the woods south of the field, now littered
with the dead and wounded. Soon after this charge, an attempt was made by the 2nd Maryland Infantry (CSA) and 3rd North Carolina
Infantry to break out of the Union entrapment. The result was as dismal as the Union attempt had been, the Marylanders suffering
heavy casualties in their charge through a small field known today as "Pardee Field", named for Colonel Ario Pardee of the
147th Pennsylvania Infantry whose troops opposed the southern attack.
The Twelfth Corps had advantages over Johnson's southerners in holding fortified
positions on the higher portions of the hill, more men and regiments were available to relieve those in the front line, and
Union artillery that provided accurate support to Williams' soldiers. Despite their hold on the hill above Spangler's Meadow,
Johnson's men could not make any headway through the strong Union defenses and had no artillery to support the attack. By
10 o'clock that morning, General Johnson realized that he could not break through or capture Culp's Hill and began to systematically
withdraw his troops, being careful not to give the Union any advantages in counterattacking his retreat. General Steuart,
whose brigade of Maryland and North Carolina troops had held the hill above Spangler's Meadow, was so distraught by his losses
that he broke into tears. "My poor boys," he said, wringing his hands as he watched his exhausted and bloodied men march by,
"My poor boys!"
Union regiments re-took the abandoned positions soon after and General Geary
reported that the rebels had gone from his front. The point of the fishhook was no longer in southern hands.
General Lee had hoped to again force the Union flanks in the early morning
hours. To coincide with his attacks, he had ordered his cavalry chief, JEB Stuart, to ride around the right of the Union positions
and strike toward Meade's supply line. This disruption would threaten Union supply lines and communications, forcing Meade
to withdraw troops to protect his threatened rear. But delays and the Union counter-attack that resulted in the defeat of
Johnson's command at Culp's Hill, forced a dramatic change in plans. The loss of Culp's Hill left him with few options. Determined
to strike again as soon as possible, Lee threw in his trump card: a grand assault against the enemy center preceded by a massive
artillery bombardment. Believing that Meade had weakened his center to reinforce his flanks, Lee stated that a bold stroke
on the Union center would break the weakest part of the fishhook. The charge would include troops from two corps- an estimated
18,000 men, preceded by a massive bombardment that would sweep the few Union batteries from this section of the Union line.
After the end of the fighting at Culp's Hill, Lee concentrated on breaking the Union center on Cemetery
Ridge. |
An aerial view of Cemetery Ridge. The Union line stretched from Ziegler's Grove at the lower left corner,
to the Round Tops in the distance. Pickett's Charge broke the center of the line at "The Angle" marked by the trees in the
center of the photo.
Gettysburg NMP | General Lee studied the Union line that morning and presented his plan. General Longstreet
was assigned overall command of the attack and ordered to execute the charge. Freshly arrived on the field, Maj. General George
Pickett's Division of Virginia troops would form the right half of the attacking column with two divisions from A.P. Hill's
Corps to form the left half. If all went well, the attack would be carried out before noon though assembling the required
number of men and artillery was another matter. Due to heavy losses suffered on July 1, Hill's six brigades committed to the
assault could only muster about 6,000 men. Combined with the 5,500 under Pickett's command and 1,600 men from Anderson's Division
of Hill's Corps, barely two-thirds of the desired strength was available. By mid-morning, two of Pickett's brigades were lying
in a shallow depression north of the Spangler Farm with the third just behind at the edge of Spangler Woods. Troops from Hill's
corps were arrayed in battle lines behind the trees on Seminary Ridge. Inevitable delays held up the attack and by noon an
eerie silence had descended on the field, broken only by scattered rifle shots of sharpshooters between Gettysburg and Cemetery
Hill. Another hour would pass before all of the preparations were complete.
Late on the morning of July 3rd, Union General Henry Hunt rode to the crest
of Cemetery Ridge. "Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes," he wrote. "Our whole front for two miles was covered by batteries
already in line or going into position. They stretched... from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view
to the left, the ridges of which were thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent. What
did it mean?"
E.P. Alexander
(National Archives) | Little did Hunt know that this line of approximately 120 cannon was arranged by General Longstreet to prepare for the
greatest charge of the war. In command of the center of the artillery line was 28 year-old Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, whose overwhelming duty was to direct his artillery battalion and judge the effect of the artillery barrage on the enemy
line. Alexander later wrote that his guns were in a "splendid position" to strike Cemetery Ridge, though his primary concern
was for ammunition. The southern artillery had to achieve good results within the first half-hour for them to properly support
the infantry assault and would require a fresh supply as soon as the infantry advanced. Alexander's commander, Colonel James
Walton, ordered the supply train brought forward to a location near the front lines so that empty ammunition chests could
be quickly replenished.
It was just before 1 PM when General Longstreet sent orders to the Washington
Artillery of New Orleans, stationed in the Peach Orchard, to fire the signal shots to begin the bombardment. The afternoon
calm was broken by two loud booms followed by a violent, simultaneous blast of fire from the solid line of Confederate cannon.
Surprised Union artillerymen ran to their cannon and returned fire. The battlefield shook under the weight of explosions.
Fire and dense smoke covered the ridges and rolled across the fields. Gunners toiled over their heated guns as shells churned
up the earth around them, knocking men and horses to the ground. Caissons and limber chests of two Union batteries erupted
in massive explosions. Alexander anxiously watched the Yankee line through binoculars. It appeared that nothing could live
under the weight of the bombardment on that narrow ridge, but the Union gunfire did not subside; these determined Union cannoneers
simply would not quit. Alexander's fears were proving true; the Confederate guns were not doing as much damage as he had hoped
in the initial attack and with the high rate of fire necessary to suppress the Union artillery, his ammunition chests would
quickly be depleted. Adding to the problem was the poor quality of some southern-made artillery fuzes and shells, many of
which failed to explode. Inexperienced gunners in several
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