Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault (just as he would plan the following year in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg). He also believed that his soldiers were in better fighting shape than their Union counterparts, despite the six preceding days of hard fighting and marching. (A number of the Union Corps had in fact not yet participated in direct combat.) Lee's plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Maj. Gens. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D. H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A. P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in the Battle of Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve. Seeing how strong the Union position was, D. H. Hill opposed the idea of a direct attack, but Lee was confident that one final push would work.

The Battle of Malvern Hill was a resounding Union tactical victory. The victory was due in no small part to Henry Hunt, the Union chief artillerist, who did proficient work in accumulating and concentrating the Union guns. Troop placement before the battle by the army's principal topographical engineer, Col. A. A. Humphreys, was also carried out capably. The ground on Malvern Hill was used effectively and the Union line had depth with a healthy amount of rested troops available to defend it. Fitz John Porter, the de facto commander for the day, played an important role in this. He posted his men well on June 30, and stationed reinforcements near to the Union line. Darius Couch, whose forces comprised half of the Union center, positioned his reinforcements in good order as and in cooperation with George Morell, whose units formed the other part of the Union middle. The infantrymen performed well also. As Brian K. Burton notes, "[the infantrymen] stayed behind the guns most of the time and did not advance too far during countercharges. This behavior allowed the gunners a clear field of fire." Furthermore, if more of anything was needed, infantry or artillery, it was available. At the forefront of the Union victory, however, was the overwhelming firepower of their artillery, as later accounts by soldiers from both armies repeatedly attested.

A number of shortcomings in planning and execution contributed to the debacle suffered by the Confederates. The Confederate brigade leaders performed well, with the exception of a few minor instances; Burton surmises that the blame of July 1 must lie with the overall commanders. James Longstreet was overconfident about the artillery strategy, which proved less effective than it could have been largely because both he and "Stonewall" Jackson had problems gathering the artillery for the assault. The Confederate practice of moving artillery with individual units instead of in one mass and the difficult terrain surrounding Malvern Hill contributed to this issue. A potential solution to this problem lay with Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton's fourteen batteries in reserve. However, Lee's headquarters never contacted Pendleton, who spent July 1 "await[ing] events and orders, in readiness for whatever service might be called for." These orders never came, and Pendleton's batteries went unused. Magruder might also share in the blame; his late arrival to the battlefield was caused by bad maps and poor guides. Since Magruder received Chilton's draft late in the day, and with no time attached to it, there was no way for him to determine the relevance of the order. Burton suggests that Magruder cannot be reasonably blamed for his attacks on the Union line: he was responding to Lee's orders and did initially try to form a unified attack on the Union line. Finally, Magruder was riding back and forth across the battlefield, making it difficult for him to be found by junior officers seeking guidance. Several other factors may have played into the Confederate repulse, including Theophilus Holmes's refusal to participate in the battle, dismissing any notion of actively engaging the enemy.

 

 

In his Battle-Pieces publication, Herman Melville penned a poem about the battle, titled with the same name as the hill on which it was fought. In the poem, Melville questions the elms of Malvern Hill of whether they recall "the haggard beards of blood" the day of the battle.

Recommended Reading: To The Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, by Stephen W. Sears. From Kirkus Reviews: In George B. McClellan (1988) and his work editing the papers of the Union general, Sears established himself as the critical but indispensable authority on flawed ``Little Mac.'' Now, in a stirring prequel to Landscape Turned Red (1983), his superb account of the Battle of Antietam, the author reaffirms his mastery of historical narrative. In March 1862, the egotistical but timorous McClellan was prodded by Lincoln into finally launching the first major offensive by the Army of the Potomac. Instead of marching directly overland from Washington, McClellan used Federal sea power to advance on Richmond by way of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. Continued below…

The ``Grand Campaign,'' however, soon belied its creator's Napoleonic pretensions by becoming a three-and-a-half-month nightmare of feints and pitched battles, ultimately engaging up to a combined quarter-million men on both sides and leaving one of every four men dead, wounded, or missing. Using hundreds of eyewitness accounts, Sears demonstrates how the most creative use of military technology (ironclad warships, 200-pounder rifled cannon, battlefield telegraph, and aerial reconnaissance) existed side by side with the most appalling mismanagement (Stonewall Jackson's uncharacteristic lethargy; McClellan's mistaken belief that the numerically inferior rebels possessed a two-to-one manpower advantage; out-of-sync attacks by both Confederate and Union generals). Above all, though, Sears casts the campaign as a clash of wits and wills between McClellan--whom he accuses of losing ``the courage to command''--and Robert E. Lee--who, upon succeeding the wounded Joseph E. Johnson as head of the Army of Northern Virginia, seized the initiative, repulsed the assault in the series of ``Seven Days'' battles, and began his long journey into legend. An authoritative, ironic, and stirring addition to Civil War annals. “…[No] serious study of the Peninsula Campaign is possible without this book.” Americancivilwarhistory.org

 

Turning Points of the American Civil War

This book offers nine essays in which well-known Civil War historians explore questions regarding high command, strategy and tactics, the effects of the fighting upon politics and society both North and South, and the ways in which emancipation figured in the campaign. The authors have consulted previously untapped manuscript sources and reinterpreted more familiar evidence, sometimes focusing closely on the fighting around Richmond and sometimes looking more broadly at the background and consequences of the campaign.

 

Recommended Reading: Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles (Library Binding). Description: EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES tells the story of the Seven Days Battles, the first campaign in the Civil War in which Robert E. Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia. One of the most decisive military campaigns in Western history, the Seven Days were fought in the area southeast of the Confederate capitol of Richmond from June 25 to July 1, 1862--and began a string of events leading to the Emancipation Proclamation and the shift toward total war.

 

Recommended Reading: The Fighting Men of the Civil War, by William C. Davis (Author), Russ A. Pritchard (Author). Description: "A must for any Civil War library!" The sweeping histories of the War Between the States often overlook the men in whose blood that history was written. This account goes a long way toward redressing the balance in favor of the men in the ranks. The reader follows the soldiers from enlistment and training to campaigning. Attention is also given to oft-forgotten groups such as the sailors and black troops. Continued below...

No effort has been spared to include rare war era photographs and color photos of rare artifacts. Engagingly written by William C. Davis, the author of more than thirty books on the American Civil War. Award winning author and historian James M. McPherson states: "The most readable, authoritative, and beautifully designed illustrated history of the American Civil War."

 

Recommended Reading: The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Review: This is one of the most useful guides I've ever read. Virginia was host to nearly one-third of all Civil War engagements, and this guide covers them all like a mini-history of the war. Unlike travel books that are organized geographically, this guide organizes them chronologically. Each campaign is prefaced by a detailed overview, followed by concise (from 1 to 4 pages, depending on the battle's importance) but engrossing descriptions of the individual engagements. Continued below…

These descriptions make this a great book to browse through when you're not in the car. Most sites' summaries touch on their condition--whether they're threatened by development (as too many are) and whether they're in private hands or protected by the park service. But the maps are where this book really stands out. Each battle features a very clear map designating army positions and historical roads, as well as historical markers (the author also wrote “A Guidebook to Virginia's Historical Markers”), parking, and visitors' centers. Best of all, though, many battles are illustrated with paintings or photographs of the sites, and the point-of-view of these pictures is marked on each map!