Field artillery in the American Civil War refers to the important artillery weapons, equipment, and practices used by the Artillery branch to support the infantry and cavalry forces in the field. It does not include siege artillery, use of artillery in fixed fortifications, or coastal or naval artillery. (See also Civil War Artillery Weapons.) Nor does it include smaller, specialized artillery termed as small arms. While the Civil War army consisted primarily of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, each retained a vital role and mission during the war.

(Left) Demonstration of case firing, which proved devastating on fields such as Gettysburg and Antietam.

Artillery determined the outcome of several major battles, including the Battle of Gettysburg, because, on the 3rd and final day, Union artillery decimated a Confederate division during Pickett's Charge, thus causing General Lee to retreat and remain in Virginia for the remainder of the conflict. Artillery was critical to the conclusion of many major battles, including Antietam, Chancellorsville, Stones River, Fredericksburg, Shiloh, Malvern Hill, and Gettysburg. See also Top Ten Civil War Battles with Most Casualties.

The battles of the eighteenth century emphasized close-order formations of soldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys. These "linear" tactics stressed the tactical offensive. Assault troops advanced in line, two ranks deep, with cadenced steps, stopping to fire volleys on command and finally rushing the last few yards to pierce the enemy line with a bayonet charge. These tactics were adequate for troops armed with single-shot, muzzle-loading, smoothbore muskets with an effective range of roughly eighty yards. The close-order formation was necessary to concentrate the firepower of these inaccurate weapons. Bayonet charges had a chance of success because infantry could rush the last eighty yards before the defending infantrymen could reload their muskets.

During the Civil War the widespread use of the rifle often caused infantry assault formations to loosen somewhat, with individual soldiers seeking available cover and concealment. However, because officers needed to maintain visual and verbal control of their commands during the noise, smoke, and chaos of combat, close-order tactics to some degree continued to the end of the war. Occasionally, the artillery battery was subjected to close range combat because infantry overran its position. The cannoneers resorted to rifles, pistols and even sabers as the tide of battle swayed between opposing armies during each assault and counterassault. The primary cause of death for the artillerist, however, was not suffered on the battlefield, but rather from an enemy prison. As a result of the putrid conditions at the numerous Union and Confederate prisons, prisoners-of-war succumbed en masse to diseases.

(Right) The Civil War as it appeared back home. It was almost 40 years before the public saw the thousands of photographs taken by Mathew Brady and his contemporaries.

The smallest tactical unit employed individually on the battlefield was a brigade, usually consisting of four regiments. Units generally moved on roads or cross-country in column formation, four men abreast. Upon reaching the battlefield, each regiment was typically formed into a line two ranks deep, each man's shoulders touching the shoulders of the men next to him. Regulations prescribed the distance between the ranks as thirteen inches. Both front and rear ranks were capable of firing either by volley or individually. Two paces behind the rear rank was an open rank of "file closers," selected noncommissioned officers charged with preventing straggling and desertion. During a battle each regiment might send forward two companies in extended skirmish order, keep six companies in its main line, and hold two in the rear as a reserve. As the fighting progressed, additional companies might be fed into the skirmish line or the skirmishers might regroup on the main line. A regiment of 500 men might have a front almost 200 yards wide. Artillery batteries also had regulations instructing each artillerist to perform certain responsibilities.

A popular prewar tactic was to have field artillery, with a typical range of 1,500 yards, advance with the infantry. The maneuver worked as long as the enemy was armed with the short-range smoothbore musket with a range of 100 yards or less. With the advent of the rifled musket in the mid-1850s, capable of a lethal range out to 1,000 yards, the tactic became obsolete. However, some were slow to grasp the implications of the effect of long-range small arms against artillery, and, when General McDowell ordered two batteries to within 400 yards of the Confederate line at First Bull Run, the decision quickly resulted in the loss of one battery and two other guns.

At the Battle of Antietam in September 1862, the Army of the Potomac had an estimated 293 guns, of which 166 were rifled. Although Antietam Creek physically separated many Union guns from the battlefield proper, many guns east of the creek could fire on Confederate positions along Hagerstown Pike. On the morning of 17 September approximately ninety Union guns were operating on the west side of the creek, mostly on the Union right flank north of Dunker Church. More guns were sent to the battlefield during the day, and by evening there were approximately 162 Union guns west of Antietam Creek.

On 17 September the Army of Northern Virginia had an estimated 246 guns, of which 82 were rifled, 112 smoothbore, and 52 of unknown type. The Confederates reported having captured 73 guns at Harper's Ferry on 15 September, but none were assembled into batteries in time to be used in the Battle of Antietam.

(Right) Artillerymen soften an objective for the infantry. Although field artillery was used extensively, it affected the enemy physically and emotionally. Although artillery frightened, demoralized, wounded, and killed the enemy, it also comprised 20 percent of all battle casualties.

The artillery of both armies was generally organized into batteries of four or six guns. Regulations prescribed a captain as battery commander, while lieutenants commanded two-gun "sections." Each gun made up a platoon, under a sergeant ("chief of the piece") with eight crewmen and six drivers.

For transport, each gun was attached to a two-wheeled cart, known as a limber and drawn by a six-horse team. The limber chest carried thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition, depending on the size of guns in the battery. In addition to the limbers, each gun had at least one caisson, also drawn by a six-horse team. The caisson carried additional ammunition in two chests, as well as a spare wheel and tools. A horse-drawn forge and a battery wagon with tools accompanied each battery. A battery at full regulation strength included all officers, noncommissioned officers, buglers, drivers, cannoneers, and other specialized functions and might exceed 100 officers and men. With spare horses included, a typical six-gun battery might have 100-150 horses.

A battery could unlimber and fire an initial volley within one minute, and each gun could continue firing two aimed shots a minute. A battery could "limber up" in nearly one minute as well. The battery practiced "direct fire": the target was in view of the gun. The prescribed distance between guns was fourteen yards from hub to hub. Therefore, a six-gun battery would represent a front of approximately 100 yards. Depth of the battery position from the gun muzzle, passing the limber, to the rear of the caisson was prescribed as forty-seven yards. In practice, these measurements might be altered by terrain.

For the North, the fight along Antietam Creek became known as the Battle of Antietam. In the South, it became known as the Battle of Sharpsburg. Of the nearly 70,000 Federal troops actually engaged in the battle, nearly 13,000 were killed, wounded, or missing; the approximately 35,000 Confederates engaged lost almost as many.

(Right) Confederate horses lay dead and artillery caissons destroyed on Antietam battlefield.

Writing to his wife, McClellan said, "Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly and that is was a masterpiece of art." In truth, however, McClellan missed a series of opportunities. By failing to commit his forces to battle on 15 and 16 September, McClellan squandered a chance to exploit his numerical superiority. On 17 September McClellan's piecemeal commitment of only a portion of his command during the battle "in driblets," as General Sumner later described it failed to deliver a knockout blow to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan's decision not to renew the battle on 18 September, with the same if not greater opportunity of success as the previous day, as well as his failure to energetically pursue the Confederate army on 19 September, allowed Lee to withdraw to the safety of the Virginia shore.

Lee, like McClellan, generally believed that the role of an army commander was to bring his army to the battlefield and allow his subordinates to handle the tactical details. But the desperate situation on 17 September forced Lee to become actively involved in the battle, despite injuries to both his hands. He spent most of the day on the heights in the area of the present-day National Cemetery, where he watched the progress of the battle and personally dispatched various units to endangered portions of the field. He sent the commands of Walker, McLaws, and G. T. Anderson just in time to halt Sedgwick's advance on the Confederate left flank; rushed R. H. Anderson to support D. H. Hill's defense of the Confederate center; and, when A. P. Hill's division began arriving at Sharpsburg in the afternoon, hurried Hill's command to save the Confederate right flank.

Although the Confederates had been forced out of Maryland, Lee's campaign had been a partial success. Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry provided the Confederates with a large amount of supplies, including clothing, shoes, thousands of small arms and ammunition, and over seventy pieces of artillery. In addition, another major Federal offensive in Virginia had been delayed, albeit only briefly. In mid-December Burnside, now commanding The Army of the Potomac, attempted to interpose his command between Lee and Richmond. The maneuver culminated in a Union defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Although Antietam was not the decisive Union victory for which Lincoln had hoped, it did give the president an opportunity to strike at the Confederacy politically, psychologically, and economically. On 22 September Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, declaring that the Federal government would after 1 January 1863 consider slaves in any state in rebellion against the Federal government to be free. The proclamation had no immediate effect behind Confederate lines, nor did it free any slaves in states still in the Union. Nevertheless, Lincoln's proclamation would be the Federal government's first official step toward the abolition of human slavery.

Shortly after the battle, McClellan wrote that Confederate dreams of invading Pennsylvania had dissipated forever. During the coming months, however, Lee would wait for another opportunity to cross his army north of the Potomac. The summer of 1863 would find the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, the latter commanded by the recently promoted Maj. Gen. George Meade, confronting each other at the small Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg.

The early afternoon of July 3, 1863, what would be the 3rd and final day at Gettysburg, was hot, humid and uncomfortable. With the temperature destined to reach 87 degrees by 2 p.m., soldiers of the Army of the Potomac lay sprawled about Cemetery Ridge, seeking whatever relief could be found from their enemy of the moment, the unrelenting summer sun. Some had erected crude shelters, using muskets and shelter-halves to escape the direct rays beaming down upon them. These proved of dubious value, and many of the men had simply gone to sleep.

Where common shells contained only a bursting charge, case shot also contained a handful of round lead musket-balls. This improved the efficiency of the exploding shell as an antipersonnel round at intermediate distances. For close-up work of 500 yards or less, however, canister was the ammunition of choice. As the name suggests, a canister round was a tin can containing a number of round metal balls (27 cast-iron roughly golf-ball size in a 12-pounder smoothbore, 110 lead large marble-size in a rifled pieces). Upon firing, the tin can was blown apart and the individual balls flew freely out the muzzle of the gun. Canister was the last-ditch defensive round in the artillery service, as the range of an infantryman's rifle-musket was approximately 500 yards.

With the exception of canister rounds, all other projectiles fired from smoothbore pieces were round. As they were fired, a smoothbore would "ring" as well as boom, producing a secondary sound not unlike that of a church bell. This was the result of the loose-fitting projectile literally bouncing its way out the barrel. This loose fit, while helpful in the loading, cost the smoothbore somewhat in accuracy.

The most popular smooth-bore field-piece was made of cast bronze. The twelve pounder, Model 1857 "Napoleon" had developed a reputation among artillerists as a fine weapon. A Napoleon could throw an exploding shell a considerable distance - nearly a mile. Napoleons were often preferred for closer range work, as their larger 4.62 inch diameter bores meant that more metal went downrange with each shot. Another advantage of the smoothbore was that it fired canister rounds more accurately than a rifled gun. As they did in the Confederate artillery at Gettysburg, Napoleons constituted 39% of the Union artillery forces.

Rifled field guns had smaller bores, usually 3 inches in diameter. These guns were primarily made of cast or wrought iron. Since the shells were designed to more tightly fit the rifled bore of the gun at firing, they were accurate at longer distances.

Typical of the rifled artillery piece was the wrought iron 3" Ordnance Rifle. Capable of throwing an exploding shell over a mile at an elevation of 5 degrees, it was an effective weapon. 3" Ordnance Rifles made up 41% of the Federal artillery force at Gettysburg.

To maximize the power of these guns, 360 in all, the Union artillery at Gettysburg employed the brigade system. In this system, each brigade contained from four to six batteries, under the direct control of the corps artillery chief. A battery consisted of six guns, ideally all of the same type. The battery was divided into three two-gun sections. Each gun was provided with its own limber and caisson, stocked with ammunition. A battery wagon for spare parts also followed each gun. Five officers and one hundred and fifty enlisted men maintained and operated this equipment, and 110 horses were provided to move it.

A gun detachment required nine men to load and fire a gun, with each cannoneer performing a specific set of functions. Cross-training within artillery units allowed cannoneers to work a battery with reduced numbers. However, the specialized nature of artillery duties meant that heavier casualties could seriously cripple a battery. Units might be forced to cannibalize gun crews, thus reducing the number of guns available for service. In times of imminent crisis, a battery commander could recruit infantry volunteers to help fill his depleted ranks.

Colonel Alexander, in position on the Emmitsburg Road near the Peach Orchard, could observe the effectiveness of his fire on the Union lines and also keep the Confederate troops in view. To him, it appeared that Union artillery fire was weakening. His own supply of ammunition was running low. Believing this was the time to attack, Alexander sent a message to Pickett who in turn rode over to Longstreet. General Longstreet, who had persistently opposed Lee's plan of sending 15,000 men across the open ground, was now faced with a final decision. Longstreet merely nodded approval and Pickett saluted, saying, "I am going to move forward, sir." He rode back to his men and ordered the advance. With Kemper on the right, Garnett on the left, and Armistead a few yards to the rear, the division marched out in brigade front, first northeastward into the open fields, then eastward toward the Union lines. As Pickett's men came into view near the woods, Pettigrew and Trimble gave the order to advance. Sons of Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Mississippi, comprising the brigades of Mayo, Davis, Marshall, and Fry in front, followed closely by Lane and Lowrance, now moved out to attack. A gap between Pickett's left and Pettigrew's right would be closed as the advance progressed. The units were to converge as they approached the Union lines so that the final stage of the charge would present a solid front.

Billows of smoke lay ahead of the Union men at the stone wall, momentarily obscuring the enemy. But trained observers on Little Round Top, far to the south, could see in the rear of this curtain of smoke the waves of Confederates starting forward. Pickett finding his brigades drifting southeastward, ordered them to bear to the left, and the men turned toward the copse of trees. Kemper was now approaching on the south of the Codori buildings; Garnett and Armistead were on the north. Halted momentarily at the Emmitsburg Road to remove fence rails, Pickett's troops, with Pettigrew on the left, renewed the advance. Pickett had anticipated frontal fire of artillery and infantry from the strong Union positions at the stone walls on the ridge, but now an unforeseen attack developed. Union guns as far south as Little Round Top, along with batteries on Cemetery Hill, relieved from Confederate fire at the Seminary buildings, opened on the right and left flanks. As Pickett's men drove toward the Union works at The Angle, Stannard's Vermont troops, executing a right turn movement from their position south of the copse, fired into the flank of the charging Confederates. The advancing lines crumbled, re-formed, and again pressed ahead under terrific fire from the Union batteries.

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