Life of a Civil War Horse
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Life of a Civil War Horse |
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Introduction
The following educational
lesson is a continuation of Civil War Horses, and is adapted from an article written by James
R. Cotner that originally appeared in the March 1996 issue of America’s Civil War magazine. Additional credits are listed below. During the American Civil War (1861 - 1865) it is estimated
that between 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 equines died, including horses, mules, donkeys and even confiscated children’s
ponies. It is also estimated that the horse casualties at the Battle of Gettysburg alone, July 1 and July 3, 1863, exceeded
3,000. Diaries and letters of soldiers often mentioned the stench of dead steeds rising up from the fields of battle, and
although thousands of horses were killed on the battlefield, disease and exhaustion were the major causes of death. Compared to all other forms of life, including humans, horses
suffered the greatest losses in killed and in wounded. Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest had 30 horses shot from
under him and personally killed 31 men in hand-to-hand combat. "I was a horse ahead at the end," he said.
(Right) Horses limbered to Union artillery. Battery M, 2nd U.S. Horse Artillery,
Fair Oaks, VA., 1862. Photo by James F. Gibson. Library of Congress. The Horse Artillery Brigade of the Army of the Potomac
was a brigade of various batteries of horse artillery during the Civil War. Made up almost
entirely of individual, company-strength batteries from the Regular Army’s five artillery regiments, the Horse Artillery
operated under the command of the Cavalry Corps. The Horse Artillery differed from other light artillery (also known as "mounted"
artillery) in that each member of the unit traveled on his own horse, rather than the traditional light artillery practice
of some riding horses, while others rode on the limbers and caissons, with still others traveling on foot. With each man on
his own horse, the unit could travel faster and more efficiently. It was the brainchild of Brig. Gen. William Farquhar
Barry, Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac, in 1861. With such a large percentage of the U.S. Horse Artillery being
artillery batteries from the regular U.S. Army, it developed a superb reputation for military efficiency, accuracy of fire,
and command presence in the field and in battle. Horses were valuable to the army
and to the overall success of military victory, and by late 1864 a prized cavalry mount was valued in excess of
$3,000. The solid-hoofed plant-eating domesticated mammal with its flowing mane and tail was used for riding, charging
into battle, carrying wounded soldiers, and pulling loads such as cannons, wagons, and ambulances. The horse population in
the nation had been greatly depleted as the war was drawing to a close. Horses died in great numbers from disease
and exhaustion, and made for large targets on the battlefield. Soldiers preferred to shoot horses rather than the enemy, because by
removing the horse, the cavalry couldn't advance, and artillery and much needed supplies couldn't be hauled. "Capture
the horse if you can, but shoot the thing if you can't!" Common words of soldiers as they fought on the battlefields of the
Civil War. The majority of
Civil War battles were fought in the South and it resulted in the confiscation of horses, mules, and donkeys from Southern
farmers who relied on the equines for their livelihood. The once vast supply of horses in the United States was
greatly diminished by late 1863, causing a single horse to be considered more valuable than a soldier. While
men were still plentiful in the North, attrition had decimated its horse population. The Shenandoah Valley Campaigns
of 1864 placed an additional strain on an already depleted supply of steads. Gen. Phil Sheridan, for example, required 150
mounts per day during his chapter in the campaign alone. The Union Army relied heavily on prized horses in the South to replace
the 500 horses it needed daily to sustain its army in the field by late 1864. Life and Death of the Civil War Horse Civil War horses were worked hard and long, but it was necessary.
A battery racing to engage a retreating enemy or to gain a position of advantage had no room for gentle treatment. The stakes
were high, and the horses paid the price. The alternative might be defeat. A man on a long, hot march, pushed beyond what
his body could bear, might drop out temporarily and catch up with his company later. Horses had no such choice. Harnessed
to the limbers, they pulled until they fell or, as happened in most instances, until they harmed their bodies beyond healing,
and then were shot. The use of mules to carry mountain howitzers was a choice based on their fitness
for the task, not due to any shortage of horses. The Manual for Mountain Artillery, adopted by the U.S. Army in 1851,
stated that the mountain howitzer was ‘generally transported by mules.’ The superiority of mules in rough country
outweighed their notorious contrariness under fire. Plodding oxen obviously were not well suited for hauling field artillery,
since rapid movement was often needed. Oxen were strong—their name is synonymous with strength and endurance—but
they were too slow. Nevertheless, oxen were sometimes pressed into service during the Civil War.
Mud or dust seemed to plague every movement of troops. Of the two, mud made
it difficult to transport artillery. Dust created great discomfort, but little more. While an artilleryman might
find it difficult to breathe and intolerably itchy in the suffocating dust, the guns and caissons could still be moved. Mud,
on the other hand, often made movement impossible. Sinking below their axles in holes full of clinging muck, guns and caissons
could be moved only with superhuman effort, the men pushing at the wheels and extra horses pulling on the traces. Sometimes
guns were simply abandoned to the mud. Cavalry on the other hand, could traverse the terrain with ease, because troopers were
not restricted to roads and paths. Feeding, of course, was a critical part of the horses’ care. The daily
ration prescribed for an artillery horse was 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of grain, usually oats, corn or barley. The amount
of grain and hay needed by any particular battery depended on the number of horses that battery had at the time. It varied
almost from day to day, but it was always enormous. The horses of the battery had to be fed each day, whether the battery
moved or not. During the Civil War, an artillery battery might sit in the same place for weeks at a time, and yet consume
thousands of pounds of hay and grain each day. The prescribed rations were not always available. Sometimes, especially as
the war went on and areas were picked clean by the opposing armies, severe shortages of grain and hay developed. At other
times, there was available grain and hay but they could not be delivered to the batteries needing them. The artillery horses
of the Union V Corps subsisted on a daily ration of five pounds of grain as Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant pushed south in May
1864. The meager rations were the result of a shortage of wagons, not a lack of grain. After the artillery wagons had delivered
hay and grain to the batteries, infantry units seized them and used them as makeshift ambulances to carry the thousands of
wounded back from the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Pasturage was sometimes available, but green grass and field plants were not
efficient foods. Eighty pounds of pasturage was needed to match the nutritional value of 26 pounds of dry hay and grain, the
prescribed daily ration. In addition, green pasturage increased the likelihood that a horse might founder. Nevertheless, pasturage
was used, either as a supplement to the regular ration or as the primary source of nutrition for short periods, if hay and
grain were not available. Water for the horses was a problem that demanded an adequate
solution every day. While in camp, a battery would discover the nearest creek or pond and routinely water the horses there.
On the march, water had to be found at the end of each day. If the water was any distance, as it often was, the timing of
the watering was critical. The guns were immobile if the horses were absent. Usually, only half the horses would be sent to
water at any one time. This meant that in an emergency some movement might be achieved, but with only half the horses present,
the battery was at a distinct disadvantage. A battery moved at the same speed and covered the same distance
as did the troops to which it was attached. This distance could be anywhere from a few miles to 20 or even 30 miles a day.
When a battery moved independently, it was not limited by the movement of the troops and was thus free to cover as much ground
as it could. All in all, there was not a great deal of difference in the distance traveled. Such gains as there were resulted
from the absence of thousands of marching infantrymen, supply trains and other units cluttering up the roads. The battery
was then able to travel without long delays due to the inevitable traffic jams caused by jostling troops. In spite of the care given to horses during the Civil War,
the animals still perished at an astounding rate. Many died of disease or were put to death because of exhaustion. Many more
were killed alongside their battery mates in battle. When an artillery battery unlimbered and took its place in line,
the horses were ordinarily moved to a place sheltered from direct enemy fire–behind a building or hill, in a copse of
trees or in a ravine. Such precautions, however, did not always protect the animals from hostile fire. "When the third
shell struck and killed my horse and bursting, blew him to pieces, knocked me
down, of course, and tore off my right arm," wrote Private Ezra E. Stickley,
Company A, 5th Virginia Infantry, while referring to his fighting at the Battle of Antietam.
On the third day at Gettysburg in July 1863, many of the Union
artillery horses were placed on the eastern slope of Cemetery Ridge, behind and below the crest. In the great barrage that
preceded Pickett’s Charge, the position inadvertently became a death trap. Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, chief of
artillery for the Federal forces, reported that fire from the Confederate guns was high. It passed over the crest and exploded
or fell among the horses on the eastern slope. As Hunt reported, ‘This cost us a great many horses and the explosion
of an unusually large number of caissons and limbers.’ The Union artillery lost 881 horses at Gettysburg. All of those
animals were not killed on the eastern slope of Cemetery Ridge, but it may be assumed from Hunt’s remarks that many
were. Horses suffered not only from artillery fire but also from the
fire of advancing infantry. The capture of a piece of artillery was a great exploit, bringing with it honor and recognition.
Confederate regiments in the Western theater were allowed to place crossed cannons on their regimental battle flags after
they had taken a Federal gun. The primary tactic used in attacking a battery was to shoot
down the horses attached to it. If the battery horses were killed or disabled, moving the guns back to safety was an impossible
task. But horses could take much punishment. They were difficult to bring down, and once down were difficult to keep down,
even with the impact of the large-caliber Minie bullets. At Ream’s Station in August 1864, the 10th Massachusetts
Battery fought from behind a low makeshift barricade, with its horses fully exposed only a few yards behind the guns. The
battery was fighting with five guns, and in a short time the five teams of six horses came under fire. Within minutes only
two of the 30 animals were still standing, and these all bore wounds. One horse was shot seven times before it went down.
Other horses were hit, went down, and struggled back up, only to be hit again. The average number of wounds suffered by each
horse was five. The Confederates were firing from a cornfield approximately 300 yards away.
By far the greatest number of horses were lost to disease and
exhaustion. Again referring to the 10th Massachusetts Battery, reports reveal a dismal trail of horses dying from disease
or being put to death because of exhaustion. Between October 18, 1862, when its service began, and April 9, 1865, when Lee
surrendered, the battery lost a total of 157 horses from causes other than combat. Of these, 112 died from disease. The most
prevalent disease in the battery was glanders, which claimed 45 horses. Glanders, a highly contagious disease that affects
the skin, nasal passages and respiratory tract of horses and mules, was also called farcy or nasal gleet in wartime reports. Forty-five of the battery’s horses were lost to fatigue
when they simply became worn out and unable to work, and so were put to death. The losses to exhaustion can be keyed to specific
events. In June 1864, 13 battery horses were lost to exhaustion, reflecting the crushing pace of Grant’s advance after
leaving the Wilderness. In the days after the fall of Richmond, 14 horses went down as a result of the hard pursuit of Lee’s
retreating army. Even when the surrender came, the killing chase continued to take its toll, with an additional 22 horses
being put to death due to exhaustion between April 10 and April 15. Five days were needed for Knap’s Pennsylvania Battery
to travel from Leesburg, Va., to Littletown, Pa., a distance of 80 miles. The battery marched with the XII Corps. The longest
distance traveled in one day was 21 miles, while the shortest was 12. The same battery, when it was unattached and moving
independently in September 1863, covered the 59 miles from Brandy Station to Alexandria in only 2 days, traveling 37 miles
the first day and 22 the second.
Tragedy of Trostle The path of the Battle of Gettysburg was like a violent
storm that left a wake of destruction wherever it traveled. The farmers, upon whose land the majority of the battle took place,
suffered severely. In some cases, nearly everything was lost. This photo of the Catherine Trostle farm was taken on July 6,
four days after the fighting had raged around her farm. Some sense of what the battle cost her can be realized in the claims
shown below that she filed for damages with both the state and federal government. There were dozens of other farmers whose
circumstances mirrored those of Catherine Trostle. Few of them, including Mrs. Trostle, were ever compensated for their losses.
Although Mrs. Trostle, under the act approved on April 9, 1868, filed the following petition with the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on behalf of husband, her claim was denied. To the Board of Commissioners appointed to assess the damages
occasioned by the rebel invasions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under the act approved April 9, 1868. The petition
of Catherine Trostle on behalf of Abram Trostle, respectfully sheweth that he was a resident of Cumberland township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania, in the year 1863; that on or about the 1st to 4th of July, 1863, he sustained loss and damage to his
property situate and being in Cumberland township, in said County of Adams, by the causes referred to in said Act of Assembly. That her husband, Abraham Trostle, has become insane, and is now in the Lunatic Asylum, that their farm was near Round
Top, and was fought over two days, and the crops and fences were totally destroyed. The fences were burned. The cows and other stock and cattle, and fowls, were partly killed on the field, and some driven away, the farm being between
the two armies, in part was fought over several times; that the family was driven from the house, which was taken possession
of by the soldiers, and nursed for wounded men, and it was also struck by shells and balls, and much injured. There were 16
dead horses left close by the door and probably 100 on the farm. She believes the property was damaged and lost to the amount
claimed. That her husband had 15 barrels of flour in Myers Mill which was taken by the rebels, and was worth $120.00. When the conflict concluded in April 1865, the South too was destitute, and
it lacked both slave labor and horse power to sustain its agriculture. Farms and lands, now overgrown
with weeds and brush, were sold for pennies on the dollar to the bidder and speculator. Although U.S. Census records
indicate that the Southern economy had stabilized by 1900, it was deprived again by the Great Depression of
1930s.
Analysis At the start of the Civil War, the Northern states held approximately
3.4 million horses, while there were 1.7 million in the Confederate states. The border states of Missouri and Kentucky had
an additional 800,000 horses. In addition, there were 100,000 mules in the North, 800,000
in the seceding states and 200,000 in Kentucky and Missouri. The disparity in the distribution of the mule population somewhat
evened out the number of draft animals available for all purposes. The South furnished—involuntarily—many horses
to the North. Most of the fighting was done on Southern soil, and the local horses were easily seized by Northern troops.
While Confederates had opportunities to take Northern horses during Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania and upon the
occasional raids into Northern territory, the number taken was small compared to the thousands commandeered by Union troops,
who occupied large areas of the South for several years.
During Reconstruction, many soldiers, burdened with battle scars and disabilities, returned
to their farms only to find them overrun by trees and brush caused by neglect or abandonment. Other veterans arrived
at the homestead only to receive the news that their former livelihoods of farms and fields had been sold by wives and
family members to purchase necessaries for the harsh winters that had confronted them. In the absence of husbands,
fathers, and brothers who had marched to the drums of war, many wives and children had indeed tended the fields, usually with
limited success, but it quickly vanished as the remaining horses and mules were requisitioned by a nearby army for
the war effort. Left to starvation, while adjacent fields were overrun with brush, or sell everything in an effort to
survive was often reality and not choice. If abandoned fields and appropriated equines weren't enough to entertain thoughts
of despair, then the local banker or some creditor usually confiscated what remained to compensate for
debt or monies owed. Those who had some tillable land remaining, were the exception and not the rule, but life can be
hard sometimes, as the saying goes, but we made it through the war, so we can make it through anything, said one soldier who
had served and fought for the duration of the Civil War.
Credits: Adapted from James R. Cotner's original work from
the March 1996 issue of the America’s Civil War magazine. While the reader is encouraged to visit and enjoy the vast collection of American Civil War magazines, it is
a great resource for educators and students of all grades. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies;
Heitman, Francis B., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, From its Organization, September 29, 1789
to March 2, 1903, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903; American Memory: Selected Civil War Photographs.
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division. Washington, D.C.; Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United
States Military Academy. West Point, NY: West Point Alumni Foundation, Inc., 1970; National Archives; Gettysburg National
Military Park; Library of Congress.
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