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General Stonewall Jackson In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign
By, John D. Imboden, Brigadier-General,
C.S.A.
Stonewall Jackson In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign
| Shenandoah Valley Civil War Battlefield Map |
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| (Click to Enlarge) |
Soon after the battle of Bull Run, Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department
of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District,
and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes. On October 28th General
Johnston ordered Jackson
to Winchester to assume command of his district, and on the
6th of November the War Department Ordered his old "Stonewall" brigade and six thousand troops under command of Brigadier
General W. W. Loring to report to him. These, together with Turner Ashby's cavalry, gave him a force of about ten thousand
men all told.
His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition
at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad and a dam or two near Hancock on the Chesapeake and Ohio, canal. The weather set in to be very inclement about New Year's, with snow, rain,
sleet, high winds, and intense cold. Many in Jackson's command
were opposed to the expedition, and as it resulted in nothing of much military importance, but was attended with great suffering
on the part of his troops, nothing but the confidence he had won by his previous services saved him from personal ruin. He
and his second in command, General Loring, had a serious disagreement. He ordered Loring to take up his quarters, in January,
in the exposed and cheerless village of Romney,
on the south branch of the upper Potomac. Loring objected to this, but Jackson was inexorable,
Loring and his principal officers united in a petition to Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of War, to order them to Winchester, or
at least away from Romney. This document was sent direct to the War Office, and the Secretary, in utter disregard of "good
order and discipline," granted the request without consulting Jackson.
As soon as information reached Jackson of what had been done,
he indignantly resigned his commission. Governor Letcher was astounded, and at once wrote Jackson
a sympathetic letter, and then expostulated with Mr. Davis and his Secretary with such vigor that an apology was sent to Jackson for their obnoxious course. The orders were revoked and modified,
and Jackson was induced to retain his command. This little
episode gave the Confederate civil authorities an inkling of what manner of man "Stonewall" Jackson was.
In that terrible winter's march
and exposure, Jackson endured an that any private was exposed
to. One morning, near Bath, some of his men, having crawled
out from under their snow-laden blankets, half-frozen, were cursing him as the cause of their sufferings. He lay close by
under a tree, also snowed under, and heard all this; and, without noticing it, presently crawled out, too, and, shaking the
snow off, made some jocular remark to the nearest men, who had no idea he had ridden up in the night and lain down amongst
them. The incident ran through the little army in a few hours, and reconciled his followers to all the hardships of the expedition,
and fully reestablished his popularity.
In March Johnston
withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than one hundred thousand
men on the Peninsula. Johnston
moved south to confront him. McClellan had planned and organized a masterly movement to capture, hold, and occupy the Valley
and the Piedmont region; and if his subordinates had been equal to the task, and there had been no interference from Washington,
it is probable the Confederate army would have been driven out of Virginia and Richmond captured by midsummer, 1862.
Jackson's
little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March
he did not have over 5000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all
around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy
had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by
an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by
General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8000 to 10,000 men.
A
little after the middle of March, Jackson concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23rd
he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester.
Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's
repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham County. The pursuit was neither
vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior
numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualifies that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley.
The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government
and General Johnston that it was decided to reinforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division
to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May, thus giving Jackson
an aggregate force of from 13,000 to 15,000 men to open his campaign with. At the beginning of May the situation was broadly
about as follows: Milroy, with about 4087 men, was on the Staunton and Parkersburg
road at McDowell, less than forty miles from Staunton, with Schenck's brigade of about 2500
near Franklin. The rest of Fremont's
army in the mountain department was then about 30,000 men, of whom 20,000 were concentrating at Franklin,
fifty miles north-west of Staunton, and within supporting
distance of Milroy. Banks, who had fortified Strasburg, seventy miles northeast of Staunton
by the great Valley turnpike, to fall back upon in an emergency, had pushed forward a force of 20,000 men to Harrisonburg, including Shields's division, 10,000 strong. General McDowell, with 34,000
men, exclusive of Shields's division, was at points east of the Blue Ridge, so as to be able to move either to Fredericksburg
or to the Luray Valley and thence to Staunton' Not counting Colonel Miles's, later Saxton's, command, at Harper's Ferry, which
was rapidly increased to 7000 men, sent from Washington and other points north of the Potomac, before the end of May, Jackson
had about 80,000 men to take into account (including all Union forces north of the Rappahannock and east of the Ohio) and
to keep from a junction with McClellan in front of Richmond. Not less than 65,000 of these enemies were in some part of the
Valley under their various commanders in May and June.
Besides Ewell's division
already mentioned, General Johnston could give no further assistance to Jackson,
for McClellan was right in his front with superior numbers, and menacing the capital of the Confederacy with almost immediate
and certain capture. Its only salvation depended upon Jackson's ability to hold back Fremont,
Banks, and McDowell long enough to let Johnston try doubtful
conclusions with McClellan. If he failed in this, these three commanders of an aggregate force then reputed to be, and I believe
in fact, over one hundred thousand would converge and move down upon Richmond from the west as McClellan advanced from the
east, and the city and its defenders would fall an easy prey to nearly, if not quite, a quarter of a Million of the best-armed
and best-equipped men ever put into the field by any government.
Early in May,
Jackson was near Port Republic contemplating his surroundings and maturing his plans. What these latter were
no one but himself knew.
Suddenly the appalling news spread through the Valley
that he had fled to the east side of the Blue Ridge through Brown's and Swift Run Gaps. Only
Ashby remained behind with about one thousand cavalry, scattered and moving day and night in the vicinity of McDowell, Franklin,
Strasburg, Front Royal, and Luray, and reporting to Jackson every movement of the enemy. Despair was fast settling upon the
minds of the people of the Valley. Jackson made no concealment
of his flight, the news of which soon reached his enemies. Milroy advanced two regiments to the top of the Shenandoah Mountains, only twenty-two miles from Staunton, and was preparing to move his entire force to Staunton, to be
followed by Fremont.
Jackson had collected, from Charlottesville
and other stations on the Virginia Central Railroad, enough railway trains to transport all of his little army. That it was
to be taken to Richmond when the troops were all embarked
no one doubted. It was Sunday, and many of his sturdy soldiers were Valley men. With sad and gloomy hearts they boarded the
trains at Mechum's River Station. When all were on, they took a westward course, and a little after noon the first train rolled
into Staunton.
News
of Jackson's arrival spread like wild-fire, and crowds flocked
to the station to see the soldiers and learn what it all meant. No one knew.
As
soon as the troops could be put in motion they took the road leading toward McDowell, the general having sent forward cavalry
to Buffalo Gap and beyond to arrest all persons going that way. General Edward Johnson, with one of Jackson's Valley brigades, was already at Buffalo Gap. The next morning, by a circuitous
mountain-path, he tried to send a brigade of infantry to the rear of Milroy's two regiments on Shenandoah Mountain, but they
were improperly guided and failed to reach the position in time, so that when attacked in front both regiments escaped. Jackson followed as rapidly as possible, and the following day, May 8th, on top of the Bull Pasture Mountain,
three miles east of McDowell, encountered Milroy reinforced by Schenck, who commanded by virtue of seniority of commission.
The conflict lasted four hours, and was severe and bloody. It was fought mainly with small arms, the ground forbidding much
use of artillery. Schenck and Milroy fled precipitately toward Franklin, to unite with Fremont. The route lay along a narrow valley hedged up by high mountains,
perfectly protecting the flanks of the retreating army from Ashby's pursuing cavalry, led by Captain Sheetz. Jackson
ordered him to pursue as vigorously as possible, and to guard completely all avenues of approach from the direction of McDowell
or Staunton till relieved of this duty. Jackson
buried the dead and rested his army, and then fell back to the Valley on the Warm Springs and Harrisonburg road.
The morning after the battle
of McDowell I called very early on Jackson at the residence of Colonel George W. Hull of that village, where he had his headquarters,
to ask if I could be of any service to him, as I had to go to Staunton, forty miles distant, to look after some companies
that were to join my command. He asked me to wait a few moments, as he wished to prepare a telegram to be sent to President
Davis from Staunton, the nearest Office to McDowell. He took
a seat at a table and wrote nearly half a page of foolscap; he rose and stood before the fireplace pondering it some minutes;
then he tore it in pieces and wrote again, but much less, and again destroyed what he had written, and paced the room several
times. He suddenly stopped, seated himself, and dashed off two or three lines, folded the paper, and said, "Send that off
as soon as you reach Staunton." As I bade him "good-bye,"
he remarked: "I may have other telegrams today or tomorrow, and will send them to you for transmission. I wish you to have
two or three well mounted couriers ready to bring me the replies promptly."
I
read the message he had given me. It was dated "McDowell," and read about thus: "Providence
blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday." That was all. A few days after I got to Staunton a courier arrived with a message to be telegraphed to the Secretary of War. I read
it, sent it off, and ordered a courier to be ready with his horse, while I waited at the telegraph Office for the reply. The
message was to this effect: "I think I ought to attack Banks, but under my orders I do not feel at liberty to do so." In less
than an hour a reply came, but not from the Secretary of War. It was from General Joseph E. Johnston, to whom I supposed the
Secretary had referred General Jackson's message. I have a distinct recollection of its substance, as follows: "If you think
you can beat Banks, attack him. I only intended by my orders to caution you against attacking fortifications." Banks was understood
to have fortified himself strongly at Strasburg and Cedar Creek, and he had fallen back there. I started the courier with
this reply, as I supposed, to McDowell, but, lo! it met Jackson only twelve miles from Staunton, to which point on the Harrisonburg
and Warm Springs turnpike he had marched his little army, except part of Ashby's cavalry, which, under an intrepid leader,
Captain Sheetz, he had sent from McDowell to menace Fremont, who was concentrating at Franklin in Pendleton County, where
he remained in blissful ignorance that Jackson had left McDowell, till he learned by telegraph some days later that Jackson
had fallen upon Banks at Front Royal and driven him through Winchester and across the Potomac.
| Shenandoah Valley Civil War Map |
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Two hours after receiving this telegram from General Johnston, Jackson was en route for Harrisonburg, where he came upon the great Valley turnpike. By forced
marches he reached New Market in two days. Detachments of cavalry guarded every road beyond him, so that Banks remained in
total ignorance of his approach. This Federal commander had the larger part of his force well fortified at and near Strasburg,
but he kept a strong detachment at Front Royal, about eight miles distant and facing the Luray or Page Valley.
From
New Market Jackson disappeared so suddenly that the people of the Valley were again mystified. He crossed the Massanutten Mountain, and, passing Luray, hurried
toward Front Royal. He sometimes made thirty miles in twenty-four hours with his entire army, thus gaining for his infantry
the sobriquet of "Jackson's foot cavalry." Very early in the
afternoon of May 23rd he struck Front Royal. The surprise was complete and disastrous to the enemy, who were commanded by
Colonel John R. Kenly. After a fruitless resistance they fled toward Winchester, twenty miles
distant, with Jackson at their heels. A large number were
captured within four miles by a splendid cavalry dash of Colonel Flournoy and Lieutenant-Colonel Watts.
News
of this disaster reached Banks at Strasburg, by which he learned that Jackson was rapidly gaining
his rear toward Newtown. The works Banks had constructed had
not been made for defense in that direction, so he abandoned them and set out with all haste for Winchester; but, en route,
near Newtown (May 24th), Jackson struck his flank, inflicting heavy loss, and making large captures of property, consisting
of wagons, teams, camp-equipage, provisions, ammunition, and over nine thousand stand of arms, all new and in perfect order,
besides a large number of prisoners.
Jackson now chased Banks's fleeing army
to Winchester, where the latter made a stand, but after a sharp engagement with Ewell's division on the 25th he fled again,
not halting till he had crossed the Potomac, congratulating himself and his Government in a dispatch that his army was at
last safe in Maryland. General Saxton, with some 7000 men, held Harper's Ferry, 32 miles from Winchester. Jackson paid his respects to this fortified post, by marching a large part of
his forces close to it, threatening an assault, long enough to allow all the captured property at Winchester to be sent away
toward Staunton, and then returned to Winchester. His problem now was to escape the clutches of Fremont, knowing that that officer would be promptly advised by wire of what had befallen
Banks. He could go back the way he came, by the Luray Valley,
but that would expose Staunton (the most important depot in
the valley) to capture by Fremont, and he had made his plans to save it.
I had
been left at Staunton organizing my recruits. On his way to
attack Banks, Jackson sent me an order from New Market to throw as many men as I could arm,
and as quickly as possible, into Brock's Gap, west of Harrisonburg, and into any other mountain-pass
through which Fremont could reach the valley at or south of Harrisonburg. I knew that within four miles of Franklin, on the main road leading to Harrisonburg,
there was a narrow defile hemmed in on both sides by nearly perpendicular cliffs, over five hundred feet high. I sent about
fifty men, well armed with long-range guns, to occupy these cliffs, and defend the passage to the last extremity.
On
the 25th of May, as soon as Fremont learned of Banks's defeat and retreat to the Potomac, he
put his army of about 14,000 in motion from Franklin to cut off Jackson's retreat up the valley. Ashby's men were still in his front toward McDowell, with
an unknown force; so Fremont did not attempt that route, but sent his cavalry to feel the way
toward Brock's Gap, on the direct road to Harrisonburg. The
men I had sent to the cliffs let the head of the column get well into the defile or gorge, when, from a position of perfect
safety to themselves, they poured a deadly volley into the close column. The attack being unexpected, and coming from a foe
of unknown strength, the Federal column halted and hesitated to advance. Another volley and the "rebel yell" from the cliffs
turned them back, never to appear again. Fremont took the road to Moorefield, and thence to
Strasburg, though he had been peremptorily ordered on May 24th by President Lincoln to proceed direct to Harrisonburg. It shows how close bad been Jackson's calculation of chances, to state that
as his rear-guard marched up Fisher's Hill, two miles from Strasburg, Fremont's advance came in sight on the mountain-side
on the road from Moorefield, and a sharp skirmish took place. Jackson continued to Harrisonburg, hotly pursued by Fremont,
but avoiding a conflict.
The news of Banks's defeat created consternation at
Washington, and Shields was ordered to return from east of the Blue Ridge to the Luray Valley in all haste to cooperate with Fremont. Jackson was advised
of Shields's approach, and his aim was to prevent a junction of their forces till he reached a point where he could strike
them in quick succession. He therefore sent cavalry detachments along the Shenandoah to burn the bridges as far as Port Republic, the
river being at that time too full for fording. At Harrisonburg he took the road leading to
Port Republic, and ordered me from Staunton, with a mixed battery and battalion of cavalry, to the bridge over North River near Mount Crawford, to
prevent a cavalry force passing to his rear.
At Cross Keys, about six miles
from Harrisonburg, he delivered battle to Fremont, on June 8th, and, after a long and bloody conflict, as night closed in
he was master of the field. Leaving one division-Ewells-on the ground, to resist Fremont if he should return next day, he
that night marched the rest of his army to Port Republic, which lies in the forks of the river, and made his arrangements
to attack the troops of Shields's command next morning on the Lewis farm, just below the town.
On
the day of the conflict at Cross Keys I held the bridge across North River at Mount
Crawford with a battalion of cavalry, four howitzers, and a Parrott gun, to prevent
a cavalry flank movement on Jackson's trains at Port
Republic. About 10 o'clock at night I received a note from Jackson, written in pencil on the blank margin of a newspaper, directing me to report with my command
at Port Republic
before daybreak. On the same slip, and as a postscript, he wrote, "Poor Ashby is dead. He fell gloriously.... I know you will
join with me in mourning the loss of our friend, one of the noblest men and soldiers in the Confederate army." I carried that
slip of paper till it was literally worn to tatters.
It was early, Sunday, June
8th, when Jackson and his staff reached the bridge at Port Republic. General E. B. Tyler, who, with two brigades of Shields's division, was near
by on the east side of the river, had sent two guns and a few men, under a green and inefficient officer to the bridge. They
arrived about the same time as Jackson, but, his troops soon
coming up, the Federal officer and his supports made great haste back to the Lewis farm, losing a gun at the bridge.
I
reached Port Republic an hour before daybreak
of June 9th, and sought the house occupied by Jackson; but not wishing to disturb him so early,
I asked the sentinel what room was occupied by "Sandy" Pendleton, Jackson's
adjutant-general. "Upstairs, first room on the right," he replied.
Supposing
he meant our right as we faced the house, I went up, softly opened the door, and discovered General Jackson lying on his face
across the bed, fully dressed, with sword, sash, and boots all on. The low-burnt tallow candle on the table shed a dim light,
yet enough by which to recognize him. I endeavored to withdraw without waking him. He turned over, sat up on the bed, and
called out, "Who is that?"
He checked my apology with "That is all right. It's
time to be up. I am glad to see you. Were the men all up as you came through camp?"
"Yes,
General, and cooking."
"That's right. We move at daybreak. Sit down. I want
to talk to you."
I had learned never to ask him questions about his plans, for
he would never answer such to any one. I therefore waited for him to speak first. He referred very feelingly to Ashby's death,
and spoke of it as an irreparable loss. When he paused I said, "General, you made a glorious winding-up of your four weeks'
work yesterday."
He replied, "Yes, God blessed our army again yesterday, and
I hope with his protection and blessing we shall do still better today."
Then
seating himself, for the first time in all my intercourse with him, he outlined the day's proposed operations. I remember
perfectly his conversation He said: "Charley Winder will cross the river at daybreak and attack Shields on the Lewis farm.
I shall support him with all the other troops as fast as they can be put in line. General 'Dick' Taylor
will move through the woods on the side of the mountain with his Louisiana
brigade, and rush upon their left flank by the time the action becomes general. By 10 o'clock we shall get them on the run,
and I'll now tell you what I want with you. Send the big new rifle-gun you have [a 12-pounder Parrott] to Poague [commander
of the Rockbridge artillery] and let your mounted men report to the cavalry. I want you in person to take your mountain howitzers
to the field, in some safe position in rear of the line, keeping everything packed on the mules, ready at any moment to take
to the mountain-side. Three miles below Lewis's there is a defile on the Luray road. Shields may rally and make a stand there.
If he does, I can't reach him with the field-batteries on account of the woods. You can carry your 12-pounder howitzers on
the mules up the mountain-side, and at some good place unpack and shell the enemy out of the defile, and the cavalry will
do the rest."
This plan of battle was carried out to the letter. I took position
in a ravine about two hundred yards in rear of Poague's battery in the center of the line. General Tyler, who had two brigades
of Shields's division, made a very stubborn fight, and by 9 o'clock matters began to look very serious for us. Dick Taylor
had not yet come down out of the woods on Tyler's left flank.
Meanwhile I was having a remarkable time with our mules in the ravine. ...News
came up the line from the left that Winder's brigade near the river was giving way. Jackson
rode down in that direction to see what it meant. As he passed on the brink of our ravine, his eye caught the scene, and,
reining up a moment, he accosted me with, "Colonel, you seem to have trouble down there." I made some reply which drew forth
a hearty laugh, and he said, "Get your mules to the mountain as soon as you can, and be ready to move."
Then
he dashed on. He found his old brigade had yielded slightly to overwhelming pressure. Galloping up, he was received with a
cheer; and, calling out at the top of his voice, "The 'Stonewall' brigade never retreats; follow me!" led them back to their
original line. Taylor soon made his appearance, and the flank
attack settled the work of the day. A wild retreat began. The pursuit was vigorous. No stand was made in the defile. We pursued
them eight miles. I rode back with Jackson, and at sunset we were on the battlefield at the Lewis mansion....
Fremont,
hearing the noise of the battle, had hurried out from near Harrisonburg to help Tyler; but Jackson had burnt the bridge at
Port Republic, after Ewell had held Fremont in check some time on the west side of the river and escaped, so that when Fremont
came in sight of Tyler's battlefield, the latter's troops had been routed and the river could not be crossed.
The
next day I returned to Staunton, and found General W. H. C. Whiting, my old commander after
the fall of General Bee at Bull Run, arriving with a division of troops to reinforce Jackson.
Taking him and his staff to my house as guests, General Whiting left soon after breakfast with a guide to call on Jackson at Swift Run Gap, near Port Republic, where he was resting his troops. The distance from Staunton was about twenty miles, but Whiting returned after midnight. He was in a towering
passion, and declared that Jackson had treated him outrageously.
I asked, "How is that possible, General, for he is very polite to every one?"
"Oh!
hang him, he was polite enough. But he didn't say one word about his plans. I finally asked him for orders, telling him what
troops I had. He simply told me to go back to Staunton, and
he would send me orders tomorrow. I haven't the slightest idea what they will be. I believe he hasn't any more sense than
my horse."
Seeing his frame of mind, and he being a guest in my house, I said
little. Just after breakfast, next morning, a courier arrived with a terse order to embark his troops on the railroad trains
and move to Gordonsville at once, where he would receive further orders. This brought on a new explosion of wrath. "Didn't
I tell you he was a fool, and doesn't this prove it? Why, I just came through Gordonsville day before yesterday."
However,
he obeyed the order; and when he reached Gordonsville he found Jackson there, and his little Valley army coming after him; a few days later McClellan was astounded to learn that
Jackson was on his right flank on the Chickahominy. Shortly
after the Seven Days Battles around Richmond, I met Whiting again, and
he then said, "I didn't know Jackson when I was at your house.
I have found out now what his plans were, and they were worthy of a Napoleon. But I still think he ought to have told
me his plans; for if he had died McClellan would have captured Richmond.
I wouldn't have known what he was driving at, and might have made a mess of it. But I take back all I said about his being
a fool."
From the date of Jackson's arrival at
Staunton till the battle of Port
Republic was thirty-five days. He marched from Staunton
to McDowell, 40 miles, from McDowell to Front Royal, about 110, from Front Royal to Winchester,
20 miles, Winchester to Port
Republic, 75 miles, a total of 245 miles, fighting in the meantime 4
desperate battles, and winning them all.
On the 17th of June, leaving only his
cavalry, under Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson, and Chew's battery, and the little force I was enlisting in the valley (which
was now no longer threatened by the enemy), Jackson moved all his troops south-east, and on the 25th arrived at Ashland, seventeen miles from Richmond. This withdrawal from the valley was so skillfully managed that his absence from the
scene of his late triumphs was unsuspected at Washington.
On the contrary, something like a panic prevailed there, and the Government was afraid to permit McDowell to unite his forces
with McClellan's lest it should uncover and expose the capital to Jackson's
supposed movement on it.
Jackson's
military operations were always unexpected and mysterious. In my personal intercourse with him in the early part of the war,
before he had become famous, he often said there were two things never to be lost sight of by a military commander: "Always
mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so
long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed
by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your
own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small
army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible."
His
celerity of movement was a simple matter. He never broke down his men by too-long-continued marching. He rested the whole
column very often, but only for a few minutes at a time. I remember that he liked to see the men lie down flat on the ground
to rest, and would say, "A man rests all over when he lies down."
(Related reading below.)
Recommended
Reading: Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, by Peter Cozzens (Civil War America)
(Hardcover). Description: In the spring of 1862, Federal troops under the command of General George B. McClellan launched
what was to be a coordinated, two-pronged attack on Richmond
in the hope of taking the Confederate capital and bringing a quick end to the Civil War. The Confederate high command tasked
Stonewall Jackson with diverting critical Union resources from this drive, a mission Jackson fulfilled by repeatedly defeating
much larger enemy forces. His victories elevated him to near iconic status in both the North and the South and signaled a
long war ahead. One of the most intriguing and storied episodes of the Civil War, the Valley Campaign has heretofore only
been related from the Confederate point of view. Continued below…
With Shenandoah
1862, Peter Cozzens dramatically and conclusively corrects this shortcoming, giving equal attention to both Union and Confederate perspectives.
Based on a multitude of primary sources, Cozzens's groundbreaking work offers new interpretations of the campaign and the
reasons for Jackson's
success. Cozzens also demonstrates instances in which the mythology that has come to shroud the campaign has masked errors
on Jackson's part.
In addition, Shenandoah 1862 provides the first detailed appraisal of Union leadership in the Valley Campaign, with some surprising
conclusions. Moving seamlessly between tactical details and analysis of strategic significance, Cozzens presents the first
balanced, comprehensive account of a campaign that has long been romanticized but never fully understood. Includes 13 illustrations
and 13 maps. About the Author: Peter Cozzens is an independent scholar and Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department
of State. He is author or editor of nine highly acclaimed Civil War books, including The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles
of Iuka and Corinth (from the University of North
Carolina Press).
Recommended Reading: Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah
Valley Campaign, Spring 1862.
Description: The Valley Campaign conducted by Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson has long fascinated those interested
in the American Civil War as well as general students of military history, all of whom still question exactly what Jackson did in the Shenandoah
in 1862 and how he did it. Since Robert G. Tanner answered many questions in the first edition of Stonewall in the Valley
in 1976, he has continued to research the campaign. This edition offers new insights on the most significant moments of Stonewall's
Shenandoah triumph. Continued below…
About the Author:
Robert G. Tanner is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. Tanner is a native of Southern California, he now lives
and practices law in Atlanta, Georgia.
He has studied and lectured on the Shenandoah Valley Campaign for more than twenty-five years.
Recommended
Reading: Three Days in the Shenandoah:
Stonewall Jackson at Front Royal and Winchester (Campaigns and Commanders) (Hardcover).
Description: The battles of Front Royal and Winchester
are the stuff of Civil War legend. Stonewall Jackson swept away an isolated Union division under the command of Nathaniel
Banks and made his presence in the northern Shenandoah Valley so frightful
a prospect that it triggered an overreaction from President Lincoln, yielding huge benefits for the Confederacy. Continued
below…
Gary Ecelbarger
has undertaken a comprehensive reassessment of those battles to show their influence on both war strategy and the continuation
of the conflict. Three Days in the Shenandoah answers questions that have perplexed historians for generations. About the
Author: Gary Ecelbarger, an independent scholar, is the author of Black Jack Logan: An Extraordinary Life in Peace and War
and "We Are in for It!": The First Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862.
Recommended
Reading: Shenandoah Summer: The 1864 Valley Campaign. Description: Jubal A. Early’s disastrous battles in the Shenandoah Valley
ultimately resulted in his ignominious dismissal. But Early’s lesser-known summer campaign of 1864, between his raid
on Washington and Phil Sheridan’s renowned fall campaign, had a significant impact on the political and military landscape
of the time. By focusing on military tactics and battle history in uncovering the facts and events of these little-understood
battles, Scott C. Patchan offers a new perspective on Early’s contributions to the Confederate war effort—and
to Union battle plans and politicking. Patchan details the previously unexplored battles at Rutherford’s Farm and Kernstown
(a pinnacle of Confederate operations in the Shenandoah Valley) and examines the campaign’s
influence on President Lincoln’s reelection efforts. Continued below…
He also provides
insights into the personalities, careers, and roles in Shenandoah of Confederate General John C. Breckinridge, Union general
George Crook, and Union colonel James A. Mulligan, with his “fighting Irish” brigade from Chicago.
Finally, Patchan reconsiders the ever-colorful and controversial Early himself, whose importance in the Confederate military
pantheon this book at last makes clear. About the Author: Scott C. Patchan, a Civil War battlefield guide and historian, is
the author of Forgotten Fury: The Battle of Piedmont, Virginia, and a consultant and contributing writer for Shenandoah, 1862.
Review
"The author's
descriptions of the battles are very detailed, full or regimental level actions, and individual incidents. He bases the accounts
on commendable research in manuscript collections, newspapers, published memoirs and regimental histories, and secondary works.
The words of the participants, quoted often by the author, give the narrative an immediacy. . . . A very creditable account
of a neglected period."-Jeffry D. Wert, Civil War News (Jeffry D. Wert Civil War News 20070914)
"[Shenandoah
Summer] contains excellent diagrams and maps of every battle and is recommended reading for those who have a passion for books
on the Civil War."-Waterline (Waterline 20070831)
"The narrative
is interesting and readable, with chapters of a digestible length covering many of the battles of the campaign."-Curled Up
With a Good Book (Curled Up With a Good Book 20060815)
"Shenandoah
Summer provides readers with detailed combat action, colorful character portrayals, and sound strategic analysis. Patchan''s
book succeeds in reminding readers that there is still plenty to write about when it comes to the American Civil War."-John
Deppen, Blue & Grey Magazine (John Deppen Blue & Grey Magazine 20060508)
"Scott C. Patchan
has solidified his position as the leading authority of the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign with his outstanding campaign
study, Shenandoah Summer. Mr. Patchan not only unearths this vital portion of the campaign, he has brought it back to life
with a crisp and suspenseful narrative. His impeccable scholarship, confident analyses, spellbinding battle scenes, and wonderful
character portraits will captivate even the most demanding readers. Shenandoah Summer is a must read for the Civil War aficionado
as well as for students and scholars of American military history."-Gary Ecelbarger, author of "We Are in for It!": The First
Battle of Kernstown, March 23, 1862 (Gary Ecelbarger 20060903)
"Scott Patchan
has given us a definitive account of the 1864 Valley Campaign. In clear prose and vivid detail, he weaves a spellbinding narrative
that bristles with detail but never loses sight of the big picture. This is a campaign narrative of the first order."-Gordon
C. Rhea, author of The Battle of the Wilderness: May 5-6, 1864 (Gordon C. Rhea )
"[Scott Patchan]
is a `boots-on-the-ground' historian, who works not just in archives but also in the sun and the rain and tall grass. Patchan's
mastery of the topography and the battlefields of the Valley is what sets him apart and, together with his deep research,
gives his analysis of the campaign an unimpeachable authority."-William J. Miller, author of Mapping for Stonewall and Great
Maps of the Civil War (William J. Miller)
Recommended
Viewing: Still Standing: The Stonewall Jackson Story, starring James I Robertson Jr., Bill Potter, and Ken Carpenter (2007) (DVD). Description:
His legacy as a military genius is widely renowned. Now, in Still Standing: The Stonewall Jackson Story, his legacy as a man
of resolute Christian character is captured in this revealing documentary. Through stunning High Definition videography and
expert narrative, Still Standing traces the life of Stonewall Jackson from his orphaned childhood, to the Sunday School class
he taught for African Americans that has resulted in a lasting impact today, to the pivotal role he played as a General in
the Civil War. Still Standing inspires, entertains, and educates as it examines the life of a uniquely American hero. Continued
below…
Review: In
true Franklin Springs Family Media fashion, Still Standing: The Stonewall Jackson Story is destined to become a family favorite.
Still Standing chronicles the life of a true Christian man brought to fame by his exemplary military acumen in the American
Civil War. But it was his faithfulness to the Gospel in his family, with his children, toward his soldiers, and the Sunday
School class for Blacks (freemen and slaves) that he started, taught, and supported that, no doubt, earned Thomas Jackson
the reward of hearing those precious words, Well done, good and faithful servant, from his King when he crossed over the river
and finally rested under the shade of the trees. This important documentary will be used in my family to inspire a new generation
to look to General Jackson as a man with flaws, but who followed hard after Christ. May mine and I, by God s grace, stand
like a stone wall before the onslaught of the enemy, trusting that we are as safe on the battlefield as we are in our beds.
--Home Schooling Today
Editor's Choice: The Civil War - A Film by Ken Burns. Review: The
Civil War - A Film by Ken Burns is the most successful public-television miniseries in American history. The 11-hour Civil War didn't just captivate a nation,
reteaching to us our history in narrative terms; it actually also invented a new film language taken from its creator. When
people describe documentaries using the "Ken Burns approach," its style is understood: voice-over narrators reading letters
and documents dramatically and stating the writer's name at their conclusion, fresh live footage of places juxtaposed with
still images (photographs, paintings, maps, prints), anecdotal interviews, and romantic musical scores taken from the era
he depicts. Continued below...
The Civil War uses all of these devices to evoke atmosphere and resurrect an event that many knew
only from stale history books. While Burns is a historian, a researcher, and a documentarian, he's above all a gifted storyteller,
and it's his narrative powers that give this chronicle its beauty, overwhelming emotion, and devastating horror. Using the
words of old letters, eloquently read by a variety of celebrities, the stories of historians like Shelby Foote and rare, stained
photos, Burns allows us not only to relearn and finally understand our history, but also to feel and experience it. "Hailed
as a film masterpiece and landmark in historical storytelling." "[S]hould be a requirement for every
student."
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