Introduction

History in Saltville, Virginia, is as abundant as it is fascinating. From ice-age mammals to prehistoric villages to Civil War battlefields, this small town seems to have been a cornerstone throughout the ages. This project hopes to preserve that sense of history by continuing to add to the Saltville story. The focus of this study is narrowed to the two Civil War battles that were fought to gain control of the Salt-Works, a key resource for the Confederacy. Although these two battles represent only a portion of the significance of this town, it is a portion deserving of intensive study.  In addition, many of the intricate fortification systems and earthworks are still visible today, and the grounds where the two armies clashed are still visited frequently by those who wish to remember the past. For these reasons and many others, this project is working to show how and why Saltville’s invaluable historic resources must be preserved and protected. 

 

Overview of Saltville Sites

Saltville’s salt deposits have influenced the history of the region since at least the late Pleistocene, when large Ice Age mammals and Paleo-Indians who hunted them were drawn to the natural salt licks (McDonald, 1984; Roanoke Times, 1996).  In the late 1700s, settlers of European descent began commercial production of salt from brine wells scattered across the valley floor (Boyd and Whisonant, 2002).  By the advent of the Civil War, Saltville was one of the three largest salt-making centers in the young United States (Sarvis, 1998).  During the war, Saltville became one of the prime mineral production centers in the South, and the defensive fortifications and battles fought there attest to its strategic significance (Rachal, 1953; Marvel, 1992; Whisonant, 1996).

 

Salt was one of the most crucial mineral resources to both the military forces of the Confederacy and its civilian population (Lonn, 1933; Holmes, 1993).  As the conflict wore on, the salt-producing facilities at Saltville grew into an enormous network of brine wells, storage tanks, wooden pipes, and open-shed furnaces with large (some up to 1,100 pounds) iron evaporating kettles (Marvel, 1992).  Here, two-thirds of all the salt consumed by the South during the war was produced (Lonn, 1933).

 

Because of its national significance to the Confederacy, Saltville became the principal Union military target in southwestern Virginia (Donnelly, 1959).  In response, Confederate engineers had constructed a complex array of trenches, cannon emplacements, sentry posts, and fortified enclosures between July 1863 and late 1864 (McDonald, 1985), manned at one point by as many as 4,000 troops (Marvel, 1992).  Two major battles were fought in October 1864 and December 1864.  The October 1864 battle is of particular interest because of the selective murders by Confederates of a disputed number of African-American Union soldiers lying wounded on the battlefield – the Saltville Massacre (Davis, 1971, 1993; Marvel, 1991, 1992; Mays, 1998).

 

At least two dozen sites containing various components of the battlefields and defensive earthworks system are known in Saltville.  A survey and inventory of all archeological (prehistoric through industrial age) sites in Saltville conducted by McDonald (1985) identified 21 sites attributable to the 1863-1864 military defenses.  Many of the locations contain multiple features, such as forts with parapets, cannon ramps, and trenches, several sets of trenches, or (in one case) a “double” fort.  Many other Civil War features in Saltville were not documented by McDonald, including some on the October 1864 battlefield.  These can be seen in the field or on air photos, or are known to local sources (Saltville Historical Foundation, undated; Kent, 1955; Haynes, oral commun., 2004; Totten, oral commun., 2004).  None have ever been mapped using the precision GPS/GIS technology that will be employed in this project.  Therefore, this research will produce a series of maps that show the location, extent, and condition of one of the most elaborate Civil War defensive systems built to protect an important industrial location.  This is the first critical step toward the interpretation and preservation of the irreplaceable Civil War resources at Saltville.

 

Historical Background 

The First Battle for Saltville- October 2^nd, 1864

George D. Mosgrove, a Kentucky Confederate soldier, described Saltville as a “natural fortress” with hills and ridges in concentric circles, which greatly aided in the Confederate defenses (Mosgrove, 1957). His account of the battle of Saltville begins in the summer of 1864, when rumors had it that Union General Stephen Burbridge’s forces were marching towards the Salt-Works on a parallel course with the Confederate forces under General John Morgan.  In late September, closer to the time of the actual battle, Mosgrove writes that scouts reported a force of six to eight thousand cavalry with six to ten pieces of artillery were coming from Kentucky, commanded by General Burbridge, General E.H. Hobson, and Colonel Charles Hanson. In addition, the scouts reported seeing two possible African- American brigades, which were in fact the 5^th and the beginnings of the 6^th United States Colored Cavalry (USCC). General Basil Duke, a member of Morgan’s army, also presents an account of the battle of Saltville in his book (Duke, 1960). He notes that in addition to the threat presented by General Burbridge, two other Union generals, General Jacob Ammen and General A. C. Gillem, were also advancing towards Saltville, but were coming from Knoxville, Tennessee, as opposed to the Kentucky route Burbridge was taking.

 

In response to the scout’s information, Colonel Henry Giltner of the Confederacy sent Colonel Edward Trimble with 150 men to Richlands, 40 miles from Saltville, to head off the Union forces. Colonel Trimble then ordered Colonel Giltner to take 100 of his men to the gap in Paint Lick Mountain to protect the main turnpike road running through that gap, and to provide reinforcements should Trimble need to fall back (Duke, 1960).  General Burbridge sent a battalion to Jeffersonville, on the Confederate right, to try another approach towards the Salt-Works. Colonel Giltner then sent Captain Bart Jenkins with another company to meet the Union forces at Jeffersonville. Colonel Trimble did skirmish with Federal forces at Cedar Bluff and was forced to fall back. The main Confederate force of 300 men was then pushed back to the summit of Clinch Mountain, and attempted to hold that mountain pass into the valley. The Union army sent 500 men around Paint Lick Mountain toward Jeffersonville, flanking the gap (Duke, 1960).

 

On the evening of September 30^th, Captain Edward Guerrant made his headquarters at the home of George Gillespie, near the grounds of General Bowen (Davis, 1999).  Late at night, the captain was awakened with news that the Union forces were firing on General Bowen’s property. Captain Guerrant responded by sending a member of the 10^th Kentucky cavalry to warn Colonel Giltner, and by sending the 4^th Kentucky cavalry to picket towards the Union (Davis, 1999). That same day, Colonel Robert Preston also arrived in Saltville with his reserves. He was unaware of the strength of the Union forces approaching the town; his orders had simply been to reach Saltville as quickly as possible, according to the account of one of his reservists and friends, John Wise (Wise, 1899).

 

On October 1^st, the evening before the battle, the Federal soldiers camped on the grounds of General Bowen, two miles outside of the Confederate position within Saltville. At that time, only the Virginia reserves were actually stationed within the town, with but a few pieces of artillery. The troops were led by General Alfred “Mudwall” Jackson, a man very much disliked and who did not inspire much confidence. However, General John Williams of the Confederacy was unexpectedly at Castle Woods, not far from Saltville (Wise, 1899).

 

The 64^th Virginia Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Smith with 250 men, and the 10^th Kentucky cavalry were both on the summit of Flat Top Mountain, guarding possible entrances to Saltville (Wise, 1899).  Following a skirmish with Federal troops, the regiments were forced to fall back to Laurel Gap. In addition, the 4^th and 10^th Kentucky Mounted Rifles were already posted at Laurel Gap. Laurel Gap is surrounded on either side by tall cliffs, thought to be inaccessible, and not to be scaled. However, the Mounted Rifles were posted as far up the left cliff as possible, and the 64^th battalion was stationed on the right (Mosgrove, 1957). Colonel Trimble was also sent up behind the mountain with his battalion. Late in the afternoon, Union forces secured passage through the mountain by pushing the 64^th Battalion from its position and crossing on the right. The remaining Confederate forces then retreated to Saltville. At Broadford the road into the town forked and split into two separate roads, both leading southward into the valley toward Saltville. Colonel Giltner took the 64^th Virginia and the 10^th Kentucky Mounted Rifles across the Holston River, and ordered Colonel Trimble to take the 10^th Kentucky cavalry and the 4^th Kentucky cavalry down the main river road, thus covering both avenues of approach.  By midnight, the entire Federal force was able to cross the mountain through Laurel Gap (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

The battle opened on October 2^nd with the Union troops attacking pickets and skirmish lines. The 4^th and 10^th Kentucky cavalry under Colonel Trimble then crossed over to ground occupied by Giltner to act as reinforcements. Colonel Trimble’s men then attacked the Union forces, and fell back slowly. Meanwhile, the Union forces charged the 4^th Kentucky cavalry and skirmished with them for half an hour. Part of the 4^th occupied a position high on the hill near “Governor” Sanders’ house, and there General Felix Roberston’s brigade of 250 men arrived in advance of General Williams to reinforce the Confederate units (Davis, 1999). 

 

At this point, Mosgrove’s account lists fighting and changing of positions, with a bit of confusion as to which regiment was moving where. Ultimately, the Confederate forces ended up positioned all along the ridges. General Williams was on the high ridge near Sanders’ hill, and Giltner was pushed back to the bluffs along the Holston River (Mosgrove, 1957). The 10^th KY cavalry was on the bluff at the ford, with the 10^th KY mounted rifles to their left. The 64^th VA reserves were then to the left of that regiment, and the 4^th KY was to the left of them. Finally, on the extreme end of the line were Colonel Preston’s reserves. Another battalion of reserves under Lieutenant Colonel Smith and Major John S. Prather were barricaded around Governor Sanders’ home (Wise, 1899).  The Federal forces advanced on the Confederate line. At midmorning, the Union forces formed into three columns and attacked the reserves surrounding Governor Sanders’ house. The 13^th Battalion of Virginia Reserves stationed at the house fought, but the Union forces were able to push them back to Chestnut Ridge. The Union troops stormed the yard, and followed the reserves up Chestnut Ridge, where they were met by the Confederate brigades of General Robertson and Colonel George Dibrell.

 

The three Federal columns then moved to attack Trimble’s position at the ford. One column went directly down Sanders’ hill, another moved along the river, and one swept across the wide bottom of the hill. The Federal forces crossed the ford, scaled the opposite cliff and attacked Trimble’s position. In response, the 10^th Kentucky mounted rifles and the 64^th Virginia was sent to support Trimble. Colonel Giltner went to the reserves barricaded in trenches at the nearby church and moved them down the road and up by Elizabeth Cemetery to support Trimble. Trimble fell back, and the colonel himself was killed (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

The Federal forces were then repulsed on all sides, particularly on the Confederate left. The Federal column led by Colonel Hanson was on the far left side of the mountain. His brigade eventually met up with the 4^th Kentucky and Preston’s reserves. Active firing ceased around 5 in the evening, and at that point the Confederates were able to hold the mountain pass at Hayter’s Gap, which was the most direct route out of Saltville (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

The Union troops continued to hold their position one mile out of Saltville until nightfall. Generals John Breckenridge and John Echols arrived after nightfall, with the small brigades of Generals Basil Duke, George Cosby and John C. Vaughn. According to the memoirs of General Duke, General Vaughn was left at Carter’s Station, while General Cosby and he were ordered by General Echols to head on to Bristol on September 30^th (Duke, 1960).  However, the following day, they received word from General Echols that they were to head to Saltville, and arrived shortly after their own brigades. With the “fresh” brigades, the Confederates were reinforced, and intended upon resuming the offensive in the morning (Mosgrove, 1957). 

 

Mosgrove noted that he saw at least four hundred members of the USCC in the battle during the day. That evening, General Dibrell told Mosgrove that his men had fought 2500 Yankees during the battle, and had taken down 200 of those men. After dark, Captain Guerrant and Mosgrove also met up with General Robertson, who claimed that his men had, “killed nearly all the negroes.” At the close of the evening, the 4^th Kentucky relieved Trimble’s battalion of guarding the ford between the Confederate and Federal camps (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

Monday, October 3^rd began with a Federal retreat ordered by Burbridge early in the morning, still during the dark. The Union troops abandoned their position without taking much of their equipment, and even leaving some of the wounded behind on the field in order to gain ground on the expected Confederate pursuit. General Breckenridge then ordered a scout to locate the Union forces (Duke, 1960).  Captain R.O. Gaithright was sent to pursue the Federals from the rear, while General Williams was sent with the brigades of Duke, Cosby and Vaughn down through Hayter’s Gap to intercept the Union at Richlands. Colonel Giltner’s brigade was also sent in pursuit of the Union troops, but was instructed not to follow too close to allow General Williams enough time to advance beyond the Union movements.

 

Evidence of the Federal retreat was seen all along the route towards Laurel Gap. Captain Gaithright eventually caught up with some of the African-American regiments near Laurel Gap. Late in the afternoon, Captain Gaithright also spotted the rear of the Federal column crossing Clinch Mountain. By dusk, Colonel George Diamond with the 10^th Kentucky cavalry attacked the Federal rear while crossing the Clinch River. General Duke wrote that he and General Cosby did overtake General Burbridge at Hayter’s Gap; however, mistakes in reconnaissance and other tactical errors allowed the Union to escape. Thus, by noon the following day, it became obvious that General Williams had been unable to head off the Union retreat, due to their head start. The pursuit was ended and the first battle for Saltville was over (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

On October 3^rd, Mosgrove wrote that Colonel Hanson of the Federal army was lying wounded in a field hospital, having been shot by a minie ball; he was drunk and swearing at the hospital staff. This same hospital is where Mosgrove writes that while surgeon William H. Gardner was tending the Federal wounded, three armed Confederate soldiers stormed into the hospital and fatally wounded five African-American soldiers. He also claims to have witnessed a great deal of slaughtering of members of the USCC on the fields, primarily by two Tennessee brigades under the command of General Robertson and Colonel Dibrell. However, Mosgrove never specifies the total number of black soldiers killed during the massacre. General Burbridge submitted his casualty report stating that of the members of the 5^th USCC, 22 men were killed, 37 wounded and 90 were missing. Captain Guerrant also discussed the incident in his diary. He noted that he heard the continuous sound of rifle fire which meant the death of, “many a poor negro who was unfortunate enough not to be killed yesterday.” He also wrote that his men did not take any Negro prisoners, and that great numbers of the African-American soldiers were killed. However, he did not specify any numbers of soldiers killed (Mosgrove, 1957).

 

The Second Battle for Saltville- December 20^th, 1864

General George Stoneman led forces comprised of General A.C. Gillem’s men, General Stephen Burbridge’s Kentucky battalions, and the 5^th and 6^th United States Colored Cavalry and the 10^th Michigan on a raid on Saltville on December 20^th, 1864. The Union forces had 6-7,000 men in total. Their objective was the same as General Burbridge’s had been in October of that year; they intended to destroy the Salt-Works.

The Confederate army pursued General Stoneman’s army from Marion. Confederate General John Breckenridge ordered one column to take the road to the left in to Rye Valley, but this route proved problematic, as the company lost their way several times during the nighttime passage. In the morning, the company continued down the mountain into Rye Valley, and turned up the valley, and marched throughout the day, ending at Mount Airy, on the Wytheville and Marion road (Wise, 1899).

 

Two roads led into Saltville; the Glade Spring road lay to the southwest, and the Lyon’s Gap road led from the southeast. Three hills a mile out of Saltville barricaded the convergence of these two roads. On these hills, protecting these roads the Confederates had constructed two forts, Fort Breckenridge to protect Glade Spring and Fort Statham to guard Lyon’s Gap. Colonel Robert Preston was stationed in Saltville with 500 men, charged with protecting these two fortifications. With him was Captain John Barr, who commanded the artillery (Wise, 1899).  With these limited resources, Colonel Preston picketed both roads to try and meet the approaching Union troops.

 

General Basil Duke with a detachment, who had traveled from Abingdon along the Saltville road, and Captain Tom Barrett with men from the 4^th Kentucky mounted rifles were also en route to Saltville to head off the coming raid. By the time General Breckenridge’s forces reached Preston mansion at Seven Mile Ford on the outskirts of Saltville on the evening of the 20^th of December, General Duke and Captain Calvin Morgan were already there, watching Saltville burn (Duke, 1960).

 

General Gillem reached Saltville first, attacking Colonel Preston’s pickets on the Glade Spring road. Shortly after, General Burbridge’s men attacked at the Lyon’s Gap road. The Union forces crested both Fort Statham and Fort Breckenridge, and moved down into the town and descended upon the Salt-Works. Colonel Preston called the surviving members of his reserves into retreat, and evacuated the town (Wise, 1899).  The Federal soldiers destroyed 1000 of 3000 boiling kettles and burned a number of the evaporating sheds before moving on to rip up sections of the nearby Virginia and Tennessee railroad. However, they failed to damage any of the actual salt wells, and the remaining kettles and sheds were sufficient to continue the needed salt production until the end of the war.

 

After the raid, General Stoneman and General Gillem fell back to Tennessee, while General Stephen Burbridge retreated through Pound Gap and into Kentucky.

 

Research Goals

The battles for Saltville are not the most prominently known within Civil War history, but they are significant historical events which should not be ignored. Therefore, one of the primary goals of this research is to expand and affirm the knowledge base about this town and this site in order to ultimately increase awareness of the importance of this site. In order to accomplish this task, the research will concentrate on determining the boundaries of the battle, and will search for confirmation of the historical record in regards to areas of encampment, artillery positions, barricades, and other military movements.

 

A second, but equally important, goal is to examine as many of the defining features of both battlefields according to KOCOA standards and the effect of the action at these features on the ultimate outcome of the battles. The defining features from both battles have been categorized into critical, major and minor defining features, in decreasing order of priority. The critical defining features will be mapped, using GPS and GIS technology, surveyed using the geophysical equipment, and archaeologically tested during the first summer’s fieldwork, while the major and minor defining features will be analyzed during a later stage of the project.

 

There are several questions that can lead the direction of this project. Those questions include: Did both battles for Saltville occur at the locations described within the historical record? Is the record correct in its placement of the encampments, picket lines, artillery positions barricades and other military movements? What is the geophysical signature of these various military features?  Where is the boundary extent of both battles? What (if any) artifacts remain on the surface, or close subsurface to confirm the historical information? Have both battle sites been completely examined by the local collectors? Through the historic research, mapping, archaeological survey and geophysical survey, it is anticipated that many or all of these questions will be addressed and answered. The Saltville sites present a challenge in that there is a vast amount of ground to be examined, and time is limited. However, through prioritizing areas to be researched and through multiple methods of analysis, it is expected that the majority of these questions will be addressed by the completion of the project.

 

Defining Features and KOCOA Analysis

A defining feature may be any feature mentioned in battle accounts that can be located in the ground, including both natural terrain features and man-made structures. The KOCOA system has been developed by military experts to analyze defining features, focusing primarily on terrain but also with consideration for historic structures that were significant to the battles. Key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment, observation points and avenues of approach and retreat are the five categories into which a defining feature can be placed. One of these five criteria must be met in order for a feature to be classified as a “defining feature”; the relative importance of that defining feature depends then upon its significance to the ultimate success or failure of the regiments in battle.

The critical defining features for the October 2^nd, 1864 battle and the December 20^th, 1864 battle at Saltville are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

 

Major and minor defining features will be delineated in the same fashion and surveyed and analyzed during the later stages of the project. In addition, we must stress that many additional elements of the Saltville defensive complex, including fortifications, gun emplacements, trenches, and sentry posts are not included in the list of defining features because they are not mentioned in the historic record of either battle. However, many of these earthworks are still in excellent condition, and should be considered within the context of any preservation planning. Therefore, as many of these features as possible will be mapped, first because they must be inventoried and evaluated and second, because they afford a rather unique opportunity to analyze a potentially “nationally significant site for the study of Civil War era military engineering” (Lowe, 2004).