In order to understand the condition of the United States Navy in 1861, it is necessary to glance at the state of affairs during the twenty years before the war. Until the years 1840, naval science during a long period had made but little progress. The various improvements in construction, in equipment, and in ordnance that had been introduced before this date had come about very slowly and gradually, and though numerous small mechanical devices had been adopted from time to time, and old ones had been rendered more efficient, no marked changes had taken place in the art of naval war. Ships were essentially what they had been for two hundred years, and they were rigged, propelled, armed, and fought upon essentially the same principles. But toward the years 1840, the introduction of steam as a motive power marked the beginning of a new era, an era of developments so rapid and of changes so radical that only the most progressive and elastic minds could follow them. The sailing vessel was about to be laid aside, except for purposes of training. In the next few years it was replaced, first by the paddle-wheel steamer, then by the screw, then by the twin-screw. The rig of the ship was next altered, and her spars and sail-spread reduced until they were merely auxiliary. Gradually it was realized that the danger from falling spars in an engagement was a disadvantage often out of all proportion to the benefits of auxiliary sail-power, and vessels were built with no spars above the deck but a signal-pole forward and aft. Stem brought with it also a new weapon. The ram, which had been the principal engine of naval warfare in the Greek and Roman galleys, had disappeared in the Middle Ages when galleys were superseded by sailing ships. The latter, being dependent upon the wind for their motive power and direction, could not attack an enemy end-on, and hence the ram became useless. Soon after the introduction of steam a few men of inquiring and fertile minds, among them Commodore Matthew Perry and Mr. Charles Ellet, a distinguished civil engineer, perceived that the steam-engine placed a ship-of-war in the same situation as the galleys of the classical period, and that the ram might be employed on the modern vessel to much greater advantage than in ancient times. Presently, the whole system of naval tactics underwent a change, due to the same cause. The close-hauled line ahead, the order of battle for two hundred years and more, gave place to the direct attack in line abreast. To utilize the guns in this new order of battle, they must no longer be mounted in broadside, but upon elevated citadels, giving them a wider sweep around the horizon. Meantime the guns had undergone a change, and were becoming vastly more powerful. First they were adapted to fire shells, which had hitherto been confined to mortars; next the calibers were increased, then rifling was adopted, giving greater range, accuracy, and penetration, and finally breech-loaders came into use. Following closely upon the improvements in guns, came the idea of protecting the sides of vessels with a light armor, at first of bar iron or two-inch plates, developed by experiment after experiment into masses of solid steel, twenty-two inches in thickness. Last of all was the torpedo, of which a slight and tentative use had been made as early as 1776, but which only made its way into successful and general employment in the war of 1861.
        There were signs of the dawn of this revolution before 1840, and its culmination was only reached during the war. But the twenty years between 1840 and 1860 were those in which the movement was really accomplished. During this period the naval administration had endeavored to follow the changes that were taking place, but it had not fully caught up with them. It had begun by building heavy side-wheelers, first the Mississippi and Missouri and next the Powhatan and Susquehanna. Efficient as these latter vessels were considered in 1847, when they were begun, and even in 1850, when they were launched, their model was promptly dropped when the submarine screw was introduced in place of the vulnerable paddle-wheel. The six screw-frigates were accordingly built in 1855, and they were regarded with admiration by naval men abroad as well as at home. The Niagara, the largest of these, was a ship of 4500 tons. The other five, the Roanoke, Colorado, Merrimac, Minnesota, and Wabash, had a tonnage somewhat over 3000. All of them were heavily armed, and they formed, or were supposed to form, the chief element of naval strength of the United Stats. This reliance of the Government upon its large frigates would seem to have been well grounded, and if a war had arisen with a maritime enemy supplied with vessels of the same general type, they would have given a good account of themselves. In the civil war, however, the enemy had no ordinary vessels of war to be met and conquered in ocean duels, and the waters upon his coast at points vulnerable to naval attack were too shallow to admit the frigates. Hence none of them performed any service at all proportionate to their size and coast of maintenance, except in two or three isolated cases of bombardment, as at Hatteras Inlet, Port Royal, and Fort Fisher.
        Of a much more useful type for general service were the twelve screw sloops-of-war built in 1858. There were five of these of the first class, among them the Hartford, Brooklyn, and Richmond, which gave and took so many heavy blows while fighting in Foraged's West Gulf Squadron. Hardly less important were the sloops of the second class, of which the Iroquois and Dacotah were the largest and most typical examples. To the same group belonged the Pawnee, a vessel of peculiar construction, whose constant service was hardly surpassed in efficiency and importance by any other ship of her size on the Atlantic coast. Besides the sloops, there were a few other steamers of miscellaneous dimensions and character, some of which had been purchased and altered for naval use; and these comprised all that the Government had secured toward the creation of a modern steam fleet.
        The normal strength of the United States Navy, if it so to be a navy at all, cannot be figured at much less than from 80 to 100 vessels, and this was the number in 1861. But of the actual total of 90, as shown by the navy list, 50 were sailing ships, line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and brigs, which, splendid vessels as they had been in their day, were now as obsolete as the galleys of Themistocles. It was in placing a false reliance upon the these vessels that the Government was at fault: it should have recognized in the course of twenty years that their day was gone forever, that they were of no more use than if they did not exist, that they would only be the slaughter-house of their gallant crews in an encounter with a modern antagonist; and it should by that time have replaced every one of them by war-ships of the period.
        At the beginning of President Lincoln's administration, out of the forty vessels composing the steam-fleet, one, the Michigan, was stationed on the lakes, and five were from one cause or another unserviceable. The remaining thirty-four, which comprised the whole of the effective force, were in the scattered situation that is usual in time of profound peace. Nine were laid up in ordinary, and with the traditional methods prevailing at the Navy Department, it would have taken some months to fit them out for sea. No orders had been issued for the general recall of the seventeen ships on Foreign Service, an operation requiring considerable time in those days, when no submarine cable existed. In the Home Squadron there were seven steamers, two of which, the sloop-of-war Brooklyn and the small steamer Wyandotte, were at Pensacola, two others, the gun-boats Mohawk and Crusader, were at New York; the Pawnee, a second-class sloop, was at Washington; and the Powhatan, a side-wheeler of 1850, was on her way home from Vera Cruz in company with the gun-boat Pocahontas. Five sailing ships were also attacked to this squadron, the frigate Sabine and the sloop St. Louis, at Pensacola; the sloops Cumberland and Macedonia, at Vera Cruz or returning thence, and the store-ship Supply, at New York. These twelve vessels, together with the Anacostian, a small screw-tender, at the Washington Navy Yard, were all that could be said to be at the immediate disposal of the Administration.
        When the vessels abroad were gathered in, and those in ordinary were fitted out, the Government had a little squadron of about 30 steamers, of which the most important were 5 screw-frigates (the sixth, the Merrimac, having been abandoned at Norfolk), 6 sloops of the first or Hartford class, 4 large side-wheelers, and 8 sloops of the second or Iroquois class. All these were exceedingly valuable as the nucleus of a fleet, but for the war which the Government had now on hand they could be considered as nothing more than this. According to the position which the Administration was very soon compelled to take, the struggle was one outrance. In a foreign war the conflict usually springs from a collision of rights or of interests, involving only a particular branch of the relations of the two contestants, and the question is ultimately settled by some from of compromise, as soon as financial or military exhaustion leads one party or the other to conclude that a protraction of the contest is not worth its while. In the civil war, however, no compromise was possible, and with the resolution shown by the Southern people, nothing short of complete subjugation would insure the restoration of the Union. In such a war, a little fleet capable of raids upon the enemy's commerce or sea-ports might be advantageous to the insurgents, but the Federal Government required materials and methods of a totally different character. No mere raids would profit it a jot. It must blockade the insurgent territory; and to do this it was not enough to keep a few ships cruising in neighboring waters, but a cordon of fast and efficient steamers must be stretched from end to end, without so much as a gap in the whole four thousand miles of coast. The reduction or even the passage of fortifications required powerful and well-equipped fleets engaged solely in these enterprises. The vest net-work of interior waterways in which the army's base and communications must be protected, could only be occupied successfully by another and equally numerous fleet. Finally, the protection of commerce demanded, from the very nature of things, far more vessels than its destruction.
        Had the material of the navy of 1861 been such as it ought to have been composed: let us say, of ninety modern war-steamer of fair quality; with such an organization that those laid up in ordinary could have been fitted out in two weeks at farthest, as should always be the case; with a reserve of a hundred, or even of fifty merchant-steamers, constructed with a view to conversion into war-vessels, at short notice, which is an easy matter to accomplish; with some system by which the latest problems in naval science, especially in reference to ironclads, had been considered and, in part at least, carried to solution; and finally, with a corps of officers graded more or less by merit, or the promise of growing fitness for command, instead of by age, or the promise of growing unfitness, had all these plain, practicable, and sensible measures found a place in the naval administration, it is perfectly safe to say that a single years would have seen the opening of the Mississippi, the occupation of North Carolina, the fall of Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile, and probably the end of the Confederacy. During the first six months of the war, there was really nothing to oppose the vigorous attack of such a force, and there was little more during the six months following.
        As the naval material was not on a respectable peace-footing, and as no provision had been made for its conversion to a war-footing, the measures adopted for its increase were chiefly makeshifts to which the Government was driven by the exigencies of the moment. The vessels purchased by the Department during the war amounted to 418, and included every variety of merchantman and river steamboat roughly adapted in the navy yards for war service. Three types of wooden vessels were built: 14 screw sloops of the Kearsarge, Shenandoah, and Ossipee classed; 23 crew gun-boats, called from the rapidity of their construction the "ninety-day" gun-boats; and 47 side-wheel steamers, known as "double-enders," for service in narrow channels, where they could move ahead or astern without turning.** Later in the war forty-eight additional sloops or corvettes of various sizes were projected, but few of these were ever finished, and hardly and before the close of the struggle.
        In the matter of ironclads, the extreme slowness with which the Navy Department moved shows that it failed to comprehend the magnitude of the struggle, and that it was unfamiliar with the recent progress of naval warfare. The advantages of a light armor-plating for vessels-of-war had been demonstrated by the experience of the French floating batteries Devastation, Lave, and Tonnante, in the attack on Kinburn in 1855, during the Crimean war. These vessels were protected by 4 1/2-inch plates, and the experiment had been deemed so conclusive that both France and England had already constructed new war-ships incased in armor. It was to be expected that a navy with a war on its hands would have directed its attention from the first moment when it was convinced of the probability of hostilities to securing some of these formidable vessels; and if a hesitation due to the want of statutory authority had led the Department to defer building until after Congress met, it would at least by that time have digested its plans so thoroughly that the work could begin at once. Nevertheless, for four months after Mr. Welles entered upon his office no steps were taken, even of the most elementary character, toward procuring ironclads. In his report of July 4th, 1861, at the opening of the special session of Congress, the Secretary, by way of calling attention to the subject, makes the following somewhat ponderous observations:

"Much attention has been given within the last few years to the subject of floating batteries, or ironclad steamers. Other governments, and particularly France and England, have made it a special object in connection with naval improvements; and the ingenuity and inventive faculties of our own countrymen have also been stimulated by recent occurrences toward the construction of this class of vessel. The period is, perhaps, not one best adapted to heavy expenditures by way of experiment, and the time and attention of some of those who are most competent to investigate and form correct conclusions on the subject are otherwise employed. I would, however, recommend the appointment of a proper and competent board to inquire into and report in regard to a measure so important; and it is for Congress to decide whether, on a favorable report, they will order one or more ironclad steamers, or floating batteries, to be constructed, with a view to perfect protection from the effects of present ordnance at short range, and make an appropriation for that purpose."

        In consequence of this recommendation, which, it must be confessed, was hardly such as the urgency of the measure demanded, Congress, a whole month later, on the 3d of August, passed an act authorizing the Secretary to appoint a board of officers to investigate the subject, a think which was certainly within the scope of ministerial powers without any special legislation, and appropriating $1,500,000 for the work. After another delay of five precious days, on the 8th of August the board was appointed, composed of Commodores Smith and Paulding and Commander Davis. The board took occasion to remark that it approached the subject "with diffidence, having no experience, and but scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture." Inconceivable as it seems, this statement was literally true; for although five months had elapsed since the new administration had come in; although it knew, or should have known, what the Confederates were doing at Norfolk, and that time was of vital moment, the very best men whom it could select took six weeks to reach a conclusion on the subject. Even at the close of its protracted deliberations, so little did the board understand the tremendous importance of its work that in its final report it sagely remarked:

"Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of adopting the iron armature for ships-of-war. For coast and harbor defense they are undoubtedly formidable adjuncts to fortifications on land. As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their advantages and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are endeavoring to perfect them, we must not remain idle. . . . We, however, do not hesitate to express the opinion, notwithstanding all we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship or floating battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope successfully with a properly constructed fortification of masonry."

The same inability to understand the situation is shown in the Secretary's report transmitted to Congress in December, in which he contents himself with this perfunctory utterance:

"The subject of iron armature for ships is one of great general interest, not only to the navy and country, but is engaging the attention of the civilized world."

        The board selected three plans, offered respectively by Bushnell & Co., of New Haven, Merrick, & Sons, of Philadelphia, and John Ericsson, of New York, from which were subsequently built the Galena, the New Ironsides, and the Monitor. The choice of plans was wise, although the Galena totally failed to accomplish what was expected of her, and neither she nor the Ironsides was afterward duplicated. The Ironsides, however, proved a very efficient vessel within her sphere of action; but so overwhelming was the success of the Monitor that hardly any other model was afterward adopted.
        The main features of the Monitor were the revolving turret, the low freeboard, and the projecting overhand. By means of these devices the ship was made to present a very small target, and her engines, battery, screw, rudder, and anchor, as well as her crew was thoroughly protected, and neither rams nor guns could make much impression on her. On the other hand, the low freeboard had also one distinctive disadvantage, in that it rel's rese, thus making it possible for a small influx of water to sink her. The idea of mounting guns in a revolving circular turret had been suggested before at various times, but had never been carried to the point of useful application. In 1842 Timby had proposed a system of coast fortification based on this idea, but the plan had been found defective, and had been rejected. In 1854 Captain Ericsson had submitted to the Emperor Napoleon III. a design of an ironclad battery with a hemispherical turret. In the next year Captain Cowper Coles, R.N., had suggested a vessel in the form of a raft with a stationary shield for protecting the guns; and in 1859 he had improved upon this design by adding a revolving cupola. But it was left to the genius of Ericsson to develop by itself the perfected application of the principle, and to construct a navigable turret ironclad which should be nearly invulnerable to every weapon but the torpedo.
         When the Navy Department finally understood Ericsson's plan, it immediately adopted it. According to Captain Ericsson, "The Committee of Naval Commanders . . . occupied me less than two hours in explaining my new system. In about two hours more the committee had come to a decision. After their favorable report had been [made] to the Secretary I was called into his office, where I was detained less than five minutes. In order not to lose any time, the Secretary ordered me to 'go ahead at once.' Consequently, while the clerks of the department were engaged in drawing up the formal contract, the iron which now forms the keel-plate of the Monitor was drawn through the rolling-mill."
        The contract for the Monitor was finally signed on the 4th of October. The extraordinary energy of the contractors when they had once undertaken the work pushed it to completion with unexampled speed. But the time which had been of the greatest value, namely, the six months from March to September, had been lost, and thus is happened that the new iron-clad was not finished in season to prevent the raid of the Merrimac in Hampton Roads, and the obliteration of the Congress and the Cumberland. In the battle of the 9th of March the presence of the Monitor, which had arrived late the night before, saved the rest of the fleet from a like fate, to say nothing of other disasters whose magnitude can only be conjectured.
        It must be remembered that the Navy Department had possessed from the beginning five frigates, sister ships of the Merrimac, any one of which could have been armored more efficiently than she was, in half the time and with half the money, and without waiting for congressional action. Evidently the department little imagined, while it was dallying for six months with the question of ironclads, that the first twenty-four hours of the Monitor's career would be so big with fate.
        In addition to the three vessels selected by the board of 1861, there were built or projected during the war nearly sixty ironclads, all of which were of the Monitor type except three, the huge ram Dunderberg, which was sold to the French Government, and afterward called the Rochambeau; the Keokuk, which sank off Charleston, immediately after the battle of April 7th, 1863, and the converted frigate Roanoke. Of the fourteen double-turreted monitors, including the Puritan, the Onondaga, the Kalamazoo class, the Monadnock class, and the Winnebago class, only six were finished in time to take part in the war. The single-turreted monitors which saw the most service were those of the Passaic class, most of which were stationed in the South Atlantic Squadron. Besides these there were the Dictator, the nine vessels of the Canonicus class, and the twenty light-draft monitors. The last were never of any use, the calculations for their displacement having been so faulty that they could not float their guns and coal.
        Hitherto we have been speaking of vessels for service on the coast or in the waters adjacent to the coast. The Mississippi flotilla deserves a place by itself. This force, which included all the vessels operating on the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Red River, and their tributaries, comprised altogether over a hundred vessels, of the greatest variety in construction and character,-propellers, side-wheelers, stern-wheelers, rams, ironclads, "tinclads," unarmored boats, mortar-vessels. As the first demand for a flotilla came from the army, its early organization was directed by the War Department, although a naval officer was placed in command. The complications resulting from this arrangement, under which, as Foote said, "every brigadier could interfere with him," were obviated, October 1st, 1862, by the transfer of the force to the Navy Department.

Recommended Reading: Civil War Navies, 1855-1883 (The U.S. Navy Warship Series) (Hardcover). Description: Civil War Warships, 1855-1883 is the second in the five-volume US Navy Warships encyclopedia set. This valuable reference lists the ships of the U.S. Navy and Confederate Navy during the Civil War and the years immediately following - a significant period in the evolution of warships, the use of steam propulsion, and the development of ordnance. Civil War Warships provides a wealth and variety of material not found in other books on the subject and will save the reader the effort needed to track down information in multiple sources. Continued below…

Each ship's size and time and place of construction are listed along with particulars of naval service. The author provides historical details that include actions fought, damage sustained, prizes taken, ships sunk, and dates in and out of commission as well as information about when the ship left the Navy, names used in other services, and its ultimate fate. 140 photographs, including one of the Confederate cruiser Alabama recently uncovered by the author further contribute to this indispensable volume. This definitive record of Civil War ships updates the author's previous work and will find a lasting place among naval reference works.

Recommended Reading: Rebels and Yankees: Naval Battles of the Civil War (Hardcover). Description: Naval Battles of the Civil War, written by acclaimed Civil War historian Chester G. Hearn, focuses on the maritime battles fought between the Confederate Rebels and the Union forces in waters off the eastern seaboard and the great rivers of the United States during the Civil War. Since very few books have been written on this subject, this volume provides a fascinating and vital portrayal of the one of the most important conflicts in United States history. Naval Battles of the Civil War is lavishly illustrated with rare contemporary photographs, detailed artworks, and explanatory maps, and the text is a wonderful blend of technical information, fast-flowing narrative, and informed commentary.

Recommended Reading: Naval Strategies of the Civil War: Confederate Innovations and Federal Opportunism. Description: One of the most overlooked aspects of the American Civil War is the naval strategy played out by the U.S. Navy and the fledgling Confederate Navy, which may make this the first book to compare and contrast the strategic concepts of the Southern Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory against his Northern counterpart, Gideon Welles. Both men had to accomplish much and were given great latitude in achieving their goals. Mallory's vision of seapower emphasized technological innovation and individual competence as he sought to match quality against the Union Navy's (quantity) numerical superiority. Welles had to deal with more bureaucratic structure and to some degree a national strategy dictated by the White House. Continued below...

The naval blockade of the South was one of his first tasks - for which he had but few ships available - and although he followed the national strategy, he did not limit himself to it when opportunities arose. Mallory's dedication to ironclads is well known, but he also defined the roles of commerce raiders, submarines, and naval mines. Welles's contributions to the Union effort were rooted in his organizational skills and his willingness to cooperate with the other military departments of his government. This led to successes through combined army and naval units in several campaigns on and around the Mississippi River.

As a result, from Vicksburg to Savannah to Richmond, major Confederate ports ultimately were captured from the land and not from the sea, despite the North's overwhelming naval strength. Luraghi highlights the South's ingenuity in inventing and employing new technologies: the ironclad, the submarine, the torpedo. He establishes, however, that these innovations were the brainchildren of only a few men, whose work, although brilliant, couldn't match the resources and might of a major industrial power like the Union. Nor did the Confederate Navy, weakened through Mallory's administrative inefficiency, compensate with an effective command system. Enhanced by a translation that retains the verve of the original, Luraghi's study is a notable addition to Civil War maritime history. Includes numerous photos.

An overview of the events in the early months preceding the outbreak of the war is presented. The chronological arrangement of the campaigns allows for ready reference regarding a single event or an entire series of campaigns. Maps and an index are also included. About the Author: Paul Calore, a graduate of Johnson and Wales University, was the Operations Branch Chief with the Defense Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense before retiring. He is a supporting member of the U.S. Civil War Center and the Civil War Preservation Trust and has also written Land Campaigns of the Civil War (2000). He lives in Seekonk, Massachusetts.

Recommended Reading: Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology). Description: "In this impressively researched and broadly conceived study, William Roberts offers the first comprehensive study of one of the most ambitious programs in the history of naval shipbuilding, the Union's ironclad program during the Civil War. Perhaps more importantly, Roberts also provides an invaluable framework for understanding and analyzing military-industrial relations, an insightful commentary on the military acquisition process, and a cautionary tale on the perils of the pursuit of perfection and personal recognition." - Robert Angevine, Journal of Military History "Roberts's study, illuminating on many fronts, is a welcome addition to our understanding of the Union's industrial mobilization during the Civil War and its inadvertent effects on the postwar U.S. Navy." - William M. McBride, Technology and Culture"