The extent of the disaster on the right was appalling and seemed at one time about to envelop the entire army. As the storm of battle passed down the line it reached Thomas, who cool, calm, and self-sustained, stood the test of one of the fiercest contests of the war. It was to him that Rosecrans first turned in the hour of disaster and in him he trusted most. The commander of the army, too, was sorely tried. He had come to win victory, but in place of it defeat seemed almost inevitable. Reforming his lines and bravely fighting, he had hurled back Bragg's army before it had achieved any decisive success. Rosecrans knew that his losses had been extremely heavy, but those of the enemy had been still more severe. He felt that on a question of endurance his army would come out first, although the dash and onset of the rebels had at the opening been able to sweep all before them. In the face of an earnest effort on the part of some of his general officers to persuade him to fall back to Nashville and then throw up works and wait for reinforcements, Rosecrans determined to await the attack of the enemy in the positions of his lines late Wednesday afternoon. He sent for the provision trains, ordered up fresh supplies of ammunition, and decided that if Bragg should not attack before these arrived, that he himself would then resume offensive operations.

        During the morning of January 1, 1863, the rebels made repeated attempts to advance on Thomas's front in the centre, but were driven back before emerging from the woods. Crittenden was ordered to send Van Cleve's division across the river, to occupy the position opposite the ford on his left, his right resting on high ground near the river and his left thrown forward perpendicular to it. The rebel right, under Polk, kept up a brisk skirmish fire on their front. Chalmer's brigade was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the "Round Forest." Bragg, anticipating an attack on his right under Breckinridge on the morning of the 1st, during the night ordered two brigades of that division to recross to the east side of the river. But none was made. About two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy showed signs of movement, by massing large numbers of his troops on our right at the extremity of an open field a mile and a half from the Murfreesboro pike. Here the rebels formed in lines six deep, and massed thus heavily, remained without advancing for over an hour. Gibson's brigade and a battery occupied the woods near Overall's creek, while Negley's was placed as supping; on McCook's right, the evident design of Bragg during the day was simply to feel the lines of our army to find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Satisfied of this, he felt that while he could maintain his position he was not in condition to attack, after the heavy hammering his army had received the day before.

        At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps commanders to feel our lines and ascertain Rosecrans's position. Fire was opened from four batteries on the centre, and a demonstration in force was made by his infantry, followed by another on McCook; but at all points meeting with a heavy artillery fire, he concluded that our army still occupied the battlefield in force, Bragg ordered Wharton's and Pegram's brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank of Stone's River immediately in Breckinridge's front. Soon after this a number of his staff officers discovered for the first time that Van Cleve's troops, sent over the day before, had quietly crossed unopposed, and had established themselves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk's line was commanded and enfiladed. It was an evident necessity either to withdraw Polk's line or to dislodge Van Clove's. The first alternative was not to be entertained until the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter. Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckinridge the remaining brigades belonging to his division still with Polk, and Breckinridge, reporting to Bragg, received his orders. The attack was to be made with the four brigades of Breckinridge's command, the cavalry protecting his right and co-operating with him. The crest of ground near the river, where Van Cleve's division was in position, was the point against which the main attack was to be directed. This taken, Breckinridge was to bring up his artillery and establish it on the high ground, so as to enfilade our lines on the other side of the river. Polk was to open with a heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his advance. The signal for the attack was to be one gun from the centre, and four o'clock was the hour set for the firing of this gun.

        Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the other some two hundred yards in rear. General Pillow, after the first day's fighting, reporting for duty, was assigned to the command of Palmer's brigade. Pillow's and Hanson's brigades formed the first line, Preston's and Adams's brigades the second. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns--12-pounders--were sent to aid in the attack.

        Van Cleve's division was under the command of Colonel Samuel Beatty, with Price's brigade on the right next to the river, Fyffe's brigade on the left. Grider's brigade formed Beatty's support, while a brigade of Palmer's division was placed in position on the extreme left to protect that flank. Drury's battery was posted in the rear. In front of Breckinridge's line was an open space some six hundred and fifty yards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines. Several hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, increasing the distance as it flowed beyond our left.

        General Rosecrans had ordered Crittenden to send Beatty's division across the river as protection to the troops on the left and centre, as from the high ground near the river the enemy, by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of our line. During the morning of the 2d Negley's division was ordered from the right, and placed in position on the west bank of the river, in the rear of Beatty's division, as reserves, being here on the left of Hazen's and Cruft's brigades of Palmer's division.

        As soon as Breckinridge's command entered the open ground to his front, the artillery massed on the west bank of the river by order of Crittenden, consisting of all the guns of the left wing, together with the batteries belonging to Negley's division and Stokes's battery, making 58 guns in position, opened a heavy, accurate, and destructive fire. Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached Beatty's infantry lines. Pressing forward without waiting to throw out a skirmish line, Breckinridge's command swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire and that of the infantry, and struck Price's and Grider's brigades, broke their lines, drove them from their position on to their support in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire division retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge behind the line of Negley's division, and there reforming. Breckinridge reports that he "after a brief but bloody conflict routed both the opposing lines, took 400 prisoners and several flags, and drove their artillery and the great body of their infantry across the river." His success, however, was exceedingly short-lived. Colonel John F. Miller, commanding the right brigade of Negley's division, had, in the absence of Negley in the rear, ordered the troops of his division to lie down under cover of the bluff of the river bank, and hold their fire until our troops from the other side crossed over and moved to the rear. As soon as the last of Beatty's men had passed through Miller's lines, he commanded the division to rise and open fire on Breckinridge's troops. Miller's fire was so effectively given as to cause the enemy at once to recoil, Breckinridge's command being also under the artillery fire on the left, enfilading his ranks. His division soon wavered, and then began falling back. At this Miller--Negley still not appearing--ordered the division to charge across the river, and to drive the enemy to their line of intrenchments, which they did. While crossing, Miller received word from Palmer not to cross his command, but as the greater part of his troops were over the river driving the enemy, Miller pressed on in person, and hurried the troops last to cross, up to the support of those in the advance. He was then ordered by Palmer to recross the river, and to support the artillery on the hill on the west bank. The troops under Miller were then advancing through the cornfield, driving the enemy, and as his right flank was fully protected, he had no inclination to turn back, and he ordered the troops forward. One of the enemy's batteries was posted in a wood just beyond the cornfield to the front. It was keeping up a brisk fire on Miller's advance, when he ordered his men to charge this battery, which they did, capturing three guns. At the time of the charge the Twenty-sixth Tennessee was supporting the battery. This regiment was broken by the assault, a large number of them captured, with the colors of the command. Sending the prisoners, guns, and colors to the rear, Miller reformed his line so as to hold the ground until relieved by other troops. These being crossed over the river under Hazen, together with Davis's division, Miller's command returned to the west bank of the river and there reformed the division in line, and took position for the night. Negley himself was not across the river with the command during the engagement.

        Bragg was deeply chagrined at the failure of Breckinridge's movement. In his report of the action he says, "The contest was short and severe, the enemy were driven back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a whole was a failure, and the position was again yielded. Our forces were moved, unfortunately, to the left so far as to throw a portion of them into and over Stone's River, where they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those against whom they were intended to operate had a destructive enfilade on our whole line. Our reserve line was so close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and returning it took their friends in the rear. The cavalry force was left entirely out of the action." Bragg immediately sent Anderson's brigade across the river, which formed in line on the front of Breckinridge's command, and remained there in position during the night. He also sent Cleburne's division over, and placed Hardee in command of that side of the river. Rosecrans ordered Davis to take and hold the line occupied by Beatty's division. Later, all the troops of Crittenden's corps crossed the river and occupied the crests, intrenching themselves in this position.

        During the morning of the 3d Bragg ordered a heavy and constant picket firing to be kept up on his front, to determine whether our army still confronted him. At one point in the wood to the left of the Murfreesboro pike the rebel sharpshooters had all day annoyed Rousseau, who requested permission to dislodge them and their supports, covering a ford at that place. About six o'clock in the evening two regiments from John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spear's brigade of Negley's division, under cover of a brisk artillery fire, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from their cover, but also from their intrenchments a short distance from the rear.

        At noon Bragg, on consultation with his generals, decided to retreat, leaving the field in possession of his opponent. At 12.15 of the night of the 2d, after Breckinridge's failure Cleburne and Withers had sent a communication to Bragg's headquarters, through Polk, stating that there were but "three brigades that are at all reliable, and even some of these are more or less demoralized from having some brigade commanders who do not possess the confidence of their commands." They expressed their fears of great disaster which should be avoided by retreat. This was endorsed by Polk at 12.30 A.M., January 3d, "I send you the enclosed papers as requested, and I am compelled to add that after seeing the effect of the operations of to-day, added to that produced upon the troops by the battle of the 31st, I very greatly fear the consequences of another engagement at this place on the ensuing day. We could now perhaps get off with some safety, and with some credit if the affair was well managed; should we fail in the meditated attack, the consequences might be very disastrous."

        By 11 P.M. the whole of Bragg's army, except his cavalry, was in retreat in good order to a position behind Duck River. His cavalry held the front at Murfreesboro until Monday morning, when they fell back and covered Bragg's immediate front. Sunday the 4th was spent in burying the dead, and the cavalry was sent to reconnoitre. On the 5th Thomas's entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro, and encamped on the Manchester and Shelbyville road.

        The cavalry under Stanley rendered very efficient service on the advance from Nashville. Dividing these troops into three columns he sent the first brigade under Colonel Minty with Crittenden's corps; the second brigade under Colonel Zahm moved to the right, protecting McCook's right flank; the reserve Stanley commanded in person, and moved with the head of McCook's command on the Nolinsville pike. Colonel John Kennett, in command of the cavalry division, commanded the cavalry on the Murfreesboro pike. There was constant skirmishing between the enemy's cavalry and artillery and each of the columns up to the 31st, as the army advanced, getting into position. At midnight on the 30th, Stanley moved with part of his command to Lavergne, where the enemy's cavalry was interfering with the trains. At 9.30 he was ordered by General Rosecrans to hasten to the right and cover McCook's flank. On reaching there he found McCook's new line formed on the Nashville road, when the enemy's skirmishers advanced and drove Stanley's dismounted cavalry out of the woods to the open field. Here he was reinforced, and charging the rebels routed them, driving them back to their lines. On the 1st Zahm's brigade was sent to Lavergne to protect the wagon trains being sent to Nashville. He had several skirmishes with Wheeler, but finally secured the safety of the train and repulsed every attack of the rebel cavalry.

        On the 2d and 3d of January the cavalry was engaged in watching the flanks of our position. On the 4th Stanley discovered that the enemy had fled. Collecting his cavalry he moved to the fords of Stone's River, in readiness to cross, and on the 5th, preceding Thomas, they entered Murfreesboro. Zahm's command went out on the Shelbyville pike six miles, meeting with no opposition. Stanley with the rest of his cavalry marched down the Manchester pike, encountering the enemy's cavalry strongly posted at Lytle's Creek in heavy force. Fighting here until sundown, the rebels were driven from one cedar-brake to another until Spear's brigade came up, when they were driven from their last stand in disorder. The cavalry returned and camped at Lytle's Creek to recuperate, after nine days of active campaigning. During this time the saddles were only taken off the horses to groom them, and were immediately replaced.

        Bragg in his retreat left in his hospitals all his wounded in Murfreesboro. By this some 2,500 prisoners fell into our hands to be cared for.

        Thus, after seven days' battle, the Army of the Cumberland rested in Murfreesboro, having achieved the object of the winter campaign. The final battle for Kentucky had been fought by Bragg and lost. Nashville, too, was now beyond his hopes, and for the great victory of the 31st, which he claimed, Bragg had but little to show.

        In the heavy skirmishing prior to the 31st, success attended every movement of the Federal army. The heavy fighting of the early part of the 31st was all in Bragg's favor up to the time his advance was checked by our centre and the new line on the right. From that time to the occupation of Murfreesboro every movement resulted in favor of the army under Rosecrans, and the retreat of Bragg after the defeat of Breckinridge gave the halo of victory to our army as the result of the campaign. In his retreat Bragg admitted that he had gained nothing but a victory barren of results, at the cost to him of 10,125 killed, wounded, and missing, 9,000 of whom were killed and wounded, over twenty percent of his command. Bragg's field return of December 10, 1862, shows an effective total of 51,036, composed of 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 1,662 artillery. By reason of Morgan and Forrest being absent on their raids, Bragg's cavalry was reduced to 5,638. This gave an effective force of 46,604, which was the strength of the army with which Bragg fought the battle.

        Rosecrans's force on the battlefield was: Infantry, 37,977; artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,200; total, 43,400. His loss was: killed, 1,553; wounded, 7,245. The enemy captured about 2,800 men. Making his total loss about twenty-five percent of his force in action, Rosecrans lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon train. Bragg lost three pieces of artillery. (Ten Bloodiest and Costliest American Civil War Battles)

        Why did Rosecrans's plan of battle miscarry so fatally and Bragg's come so near absolute success? The fault was not in the plan as conceived by the former. The near success of the latter proved a vindication of that. The originator of the plan was not at fault personally, for at no time during the battle did he falter or prove unequal to his command. When called on to give up his plan of the offensive and assume the defensive to save his army, the wonderful power of Rosecrans as a general over troops was never displayed to a greater advantage. With the blood from a slight wound on his check, in a light blue army overcoat, through the mud and rain of the battlefield, he rode along the line inspiring his troops with the confidence he felt as to the final result. To Rosecrans there was but one outcome to the battle at Stone's River, and that was victory. When some of his general officers advised retreat to Nashville, not for an instant did he falter in his determination to "fight or die right here." The demoralization of one of his division commanders was so great, that on Thursday afternoon, when the rebels were massing on Rosecrans's right, this general, commanding a division, announced to his brigade commanders that in the event of the anticipated assault resulting disastrously, he proposed to take his division and cut his way through to Nashville. To his troops--the greater part of whom had never seen Rosecrans under the enemy's fire--when on their return from the cedars, they formed anew in front of the Nashville pike--seeing the Commanding General of the army riding fearlessly on the extreme front, in the heat of battle, cool and collected, giving orders and encouraging his men--his mere presence was an inspiration. His personal bravery was never more fully shown than when he rode down to the "Round Forest" with his staff, under fire, at the time Garesché was killed by a shell that only missed the chief by a few inches. In this ride Rosecrans had three mounted orderlies shot dead while following him. When the entire extent of McCook's disaster in its crushing force was revealed to him, he felt the full burden of his responsibility, and rising to the demands of the hour he was superb. Dashing from one point to another, quick to discern danger and ready to meet it, shrinking from no personal exposure, dispatching his staff on the gallop, hurrying troops into position, massing the artillery and forming his new lines on grounds of his own choosing, confident of ultimate success, and showing his troops that he had all confidence in them, it was worth months of an ordinary life-time to have been with Rosecrans when by his own unconquered spirit he plucked victory from defeat and glory from disaster.

        But if the plan was not at fault, what was? Rosecrans started from Nashville for an offensive campaign, and before his plan of battle had met the test, he was compelled to abandon it, and assume the defensive. Where was the fault and who was to blame? The fault was McCook's defective line, and in part Rosecrans was responsible for it. He ought never to have trusted the formation of a line of battle so important to the safety of his whole army to McCook alone, and he certainly knew this. Rosecrans gave his personal attention to the left, but he should at least have ordered the change his quick eye detected as necessary in McCook's line, and not trusted to chance and McCook's ability to withstand the attack with his faulty line. No one who saw him at Stone's River the 31st of December will say aught against the personal bravery and courage of McCook under fire. All that he could do to aid in repairing the great disaster of that day he did to the best of his ability. He stayed with Davis's division under fire as long as it held together, and then gave personal directions to Sheridan's troops, in the gallant fight they made against overwhelming odds. As Rosecrans himself says in his official report of McCook, "a tried, faithful, and loyal soldier, who bravely breasted the battle at Shiloh and Perryville, and as bravely on the bloody field of Stone's River." But there is something more than mere physical bravery required in a general officer in command of as large a body of troops as a corps d'armee. As an instructor at West Point, McCook maintained a high rank. As a brigade and division commander under Buell, there was none his superior in the care and attention he gave his troops on the march, in camp, or on the drill-ground. His division at Shiloh as it marched to the front on the second day did him full credit, and in his handling of it on that field he did credit to it and to himself. What McCook lacked was the ability to handle large bodies of troops independently of a superior officer to give him commands. This was his experience at Perryville, and it was repeated at Stone's River. With the known results of Perryville, McCook ought never to have been placed in command of the "right wing." Rosecrans at Stone's River, of necessity was on the left, and being there he should have had a general in command of the right with greater military capacity than McCook. Rosecrans's confidence was so slight in his commander of the left that he felt his own presence was needed there in the movement of the troops in that part of the plan of battle.

        Rosecrans in his report repeatedly speaks of "the faulty line of McCook's formation on the right." But he knew of this on the 30th, and told McCook that it was improperly placed. McCook did not think so. Rosecrans told him that it faced too much to the cast and not enough to the south, that it was too weak and long, and was liable to be flanked. Knowing all this and knowing McCook's pride of opinion, for McCook told him he "did not see how he could make a better line," or a "better disposition of my troops," it was the plain duty of Rosecrans to reform the line, to conform to what it should be in his judgment. The order to McCook to build camp fires for a mile beyond his right, was another factor that brought about the combination that broke the line on the right. Rosecrans was correct in the conception of this, in order to mislead Bragg and cause him to strengthen his left at the expense of his right. Had Bragg awaited Rosecrans's attack, this building of fires was correct--if it took troops away from the right to reinforce the left; but this it did not do. Bragg moved McCown and Cleburne's divisions from his right to his left on Tuesday, but after this Bragg brought none of his forces across the river until Wednesday afternoon. The building of the fires caused Bragg to prolong his lines, lengthening them to the extent that before Hardee struck Kirk's and Willich's brigades, he thought our line extended a division front to their right. Finding this not to be the case, he whirled his left with all the force of double numbers on to the right of McCook. The rebels then swinging around threw themselves in the rear of Johnson's division before they struck any troops on their front. Of course it is mere guess-work to say just what the outcome might have been of any other formation of the line, but it is safe to say that had the left instead of the centre of Hardee struck the right of McCook, there would have been a better chance for the troops on the extreme right of his line to have shown the spirit that was in them, before they were overpowered by mere superiority of numbers.

        Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a great degree the bringing about of that mishap which imperilled the safety of the entire army. Even granting that Johnson was not in any way responsible for the position occupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is hard to find any excuse or even explanation for a general officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy was in force on his front, and intending to attack his command at daylight the next morning, would place his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear. This too, when he knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety of the entire army had been committed to his keeping. What then shall be said for him when it appears by the report of the commanding officer of his reserve brigade that when it returned from the support of a cavalry reconnoissance, the general commanding the division ordered this brigade, on the eve of battle, to take position in the woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in supporting distance of the front line? He could not have thought that the division headquarters needed the support of the reserve more than the line of battle. It is safe to say that had the line of Johnson's division been properly formed, so as to give the most strength to the command--short and well centred, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin's in reserve, with all officers in their places--these troops would have given a very different account of themselves when the blow struck the right. There was no commanding officer in the front with Johnson's division, of greater command than a regiment--save General Kirk. The troops of Willich's brigade on the right flank refused to come to his assistance, because there was no one to give them orders. Johnson says in his official report that "In consultation with Major-General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had reliable information to the effect that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite to our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning." Johnson then coolly adds: "His prediction proved true." Yet with these facts staring them in the face, McCook and Johnson made no other efforts to strengthen the right of the line, and Johnson, on the arrival of his reserve brigade later, posted it in the woods a mile and a half from his front "near his headquarters." General Kirk was mortally wounded in the attack on his command, but lived long enough after the battle to make a report of the part taken in the engagement by his brigade. He states in his report, that he suggested to Johnson to send his reserve brigade to support the main lines, and that Johnson declined to do so.

        The location of Johnson's headquarters, and Johnson being there, makes him responsible for the capture of Willich, and the breaking up of that fine brigade. Willich had been on the line for an hour before daylight with his brigade under arms, and from what he heard of the movements of the enemy in his front, he was satisfied that a change should be made in the position of the division, and started to Johnson's headquarters to communicate with him. Before he could return to his troops, the enemy was upon them, and drove them from the position they held, without their making a stand. Being without either division or brigade commander, they drifted to the rear. Willich had a horse shot under him, and was captured without giving an order, before he reached his command.

        When the artillery was posted in line of battle on the 30th, roads were cut through the cedars to allow the batteries to reach the front line. The heavy loss of guns, reported by Rosecrans, was occasioned by these batteries being unable to reach the roads through the cedar thickets in the retreat, and in many instances guns were abandoned in the woods, through which it was impossible to haul them.

        Bragg alleges in his official report that our troops were surprised, and cites the fact that his men passed through the camps where breakfast was being prepared. He was right as to his fact, but wrong in his deduction. Willich's brigade was the only one that was not through the morning meal, and this was by reason of his troops being under arms for nearly two hours prior to this time, after which Willich gave them orders to prepare their meal. Kirk's brigade had been under arms since five o'clock in the morning, ready for action an hour before the battle commenced, and in Post's brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before the first dawn of light. The front of all these brigades was covered with heavy picket lines well thrown out. General Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o'clock in the morning, "great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front, with movements of troops to their left," and from four o'clock in the morning until seven, Sheridan's troops were standing under arms, and the cannoneers were at their places.

        It is difficult to determine which to admire the more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning, were reformed under the eye of the commanding general, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannon mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day. One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand sturdy resistance of the rocky coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces. In each of these, the two armies displayed their distinctive feature to the best. Under Thomas, the Centre of the army evinced, in a marked degree, the staying qualities of that commander, which afterward were shown so conspicuously at Chickamauga.  (Battle of Chickamauga: Homepage)

Source: "The Army Of The Cumberland" (Chapter VIII), By Henry M. Cist, Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. V.; A. A. G. On The Staff Of Major General Rosecrans, And The Staff Of Major-General Thomas; Secretary Of The Society Of The, Army Of The Cumberland.