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Battle of Five Forks
|Battle of Five Forks Map
|Civil War Five Forks Map
Ulysses S. Grant (1822–85). Personal Memoirs. 1885–86.
Diary Pictures Papers History Essay General U.S. Grant
Interview with Sheridan—Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac—Sheridan’s Advance
on Five Forks—Battle of Five Forks—Parke and Wright Storm the Enemy’s Line—Battles before Petersburg
|SHERIDAN reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His horses, of course,
were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to
have them shod and put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan’s arrival at City Point I prepared his
instructions for the move which I had decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.
| After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked
out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself—not in the presence of anybody else, even
of a member of my staff. In preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing Five
Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But the
Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate
except by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat,
I provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of
supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get
in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and co-operate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined
forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had received, to act in co-operation with the armies around
Petersburg and Richmond.
| I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed
somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself
between the two main armies of the enemy. I said to him: “General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely
as a blind;” and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended
to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and slapping
his hand on his leg he said: “I am glad to hear it, and we can do it.”
| Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks
until he got further instructions from me.
| One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced,
and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then
established, at Dabney’s Mills. He met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects
of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. Although my chief-of-staff had
urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan
to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice
where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news,
and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing
as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement
at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders
were given accordingly.
| Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having
been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could
move. On that date I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg.
It soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost
so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink,
and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands
so common in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every
foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were
so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west
to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading
north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee’s line.
| This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines
to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy’s extreme right, or Five Forks. The column moving detached from
the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extending
to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown
into line between him and Five Forks.
| My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks,
get on the enemy’s right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault
in the centre might be successfully made. General Wright’s corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended
to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan’s success. He was to move under cover as close to the enemy as
he could get.
| It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design
to be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced
on the 29th. These roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such
vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. He did
on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two
or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the James River to
come over on call. He came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank.
| Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of
the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel
cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks.
Here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.
| In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken
place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright’s corps
to his assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright’s corps because that corps was already in
line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from
him; but the 2d (Humphreys’s) and 5th (Warren’s) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it
in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.
| Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night
(the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him.
He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o’clock next morning. When he did move it
was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded
it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent
orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now felt that he
could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank
or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move forward without him. However, Ayres’s
division of Warren’s corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder
of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.
| Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o’clock on the 1st,
but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. Griffin’s division in
backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. This did not
continue long, however; the division was brought back and with Ayres’s division did most excellent service during the
day. Crawford’s division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to
bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once there it did very excellent
| Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little
later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient
to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac
during the night. Unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie Court-House,
or even further than that for the night.
| It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford’s division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren,
directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer
to him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.
The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made.
| I was so much dissatisfied with Warren’s dilatory movements
in the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last
moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his
dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had before discovered a defect
which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. He could
see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might
occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move.
| I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention
to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings
for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It was upon that authorization
that Sheridan removed Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I had not long before
taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty.
| It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets
of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one
was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand
prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were pursued in
different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.
| This pursuit continued until about nine o’clock at night,
when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy’s line which had been captured,
returned, sending the 5th corps across Hatcher’s Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt,
with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.
| This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of
the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o’clock on the morning of the 2d.
I also ordered the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to hold themselves
in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front.
| I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day;
in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because he was so much interested in the movements
taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River,
directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly
enter the city of Richmond.
| I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks
as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single
die. It was for this reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the news of the
capture of Five Forks. The corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and
it would be impossible to make the assault then. But we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole
line including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the
| At that hour Parke’s and Wright’s corps moved out
as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and
went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy’s line. Parke,
who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that
point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he could make no advance forward
and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold
them; but he succeeded in this.
| Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher’s
Run, sweeping everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something
of a stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. As you proceed to the left the
outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about Hatcher’s Run they must be nearly two
miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners—Wright about three
thousand of them.
| In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions
they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their
front; and before Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy’s intrenchments.
The second corps soon followed; and the outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched
from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher’s Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside
of the city.
| My headquarters were still at Dabney’s saw-mills. As soon
as I received the news of Wright’s success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including
the troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City Point. Further dispatches
kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to these points. Finding at length that they were all in, I mounted
my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright’s
three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside by General Meade and his staff.
| Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost
ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from
the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of Lee’s army around to the support of his extreme right. As
soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding
the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for
this would separate Richmond and Petersburg.
| Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to
Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river
above. At eleven o’clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point. With
this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect
his flank. He also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses.
| The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry
them by assault. About one o’clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster’s division of the 24th corps
(Gibbon’s), supported by two brigades from Ord’s command. The battle was desperate and the National troops were
repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The
guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth
| I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In
moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The
enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles. This position, naturally a strong
and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault,
which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command
over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards
Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter made two assaults, both of which
failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.
| Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed
Humphreys to send a division back to his relief. He went himself.
| Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent
Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had assembled there. Merritt drove them north
to the Appomattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and
the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder,
portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.
Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain
the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:
BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG,
2, 1865.—4.40 P.M.
COLONEL T. S. BOWERS,
We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox
below Petersburg to the river above. Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were
cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps
is above them. Miles’s division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side
Railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whether Sheridan would get up in time,
General Humphreys was sent with another division from here. The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount
to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and guns accurately
however.… I think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.
U. S. GRANT,
| During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the
river above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an
assault at six o’clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.|
|Battle of Five Forks Map
|Civil War Five Forks Battlefield Map
Map courtesy Civil War Trust located online Civilwar.org